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REPUBLICAN REVIVAL/INTERPRETIVE TURN
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*
The civic republican revival and the interpretive turn are two leading
movements in constitutional jurisprudence. Civic republicanism emphasizes
that citizens belong to a political community where they participate in a
dialogue about the common good. Interpretivism, meanwhile, holds that all
of our practices, including constitutional adjudication, are interpretive; we are
.always situated within interpretative communities and traditions that
simultaneously constrain and enable understanding. Civic republicanism and
interpretivism, however, both face serious challenges.
Critics of the
republican revival charge that it invites oppression and silencing of divergent
voices because it emphasizes the community and the common good.
Opponents of the interpretive turn charge that it lacks the critical bite that we
need to evaluatejudicial decisions. Republicanism and interpretivism, though,
can be synthesized into a single theory of constitutional jurisprudence and
political action-republican interpretivism-that can withstand the charges
being leveled against each independent theory. Republican interpretivism has
critical bite because it focuses on the common good: a constitutional decision
as well as any other political action should be evaluated by asking whether it
promotes the common good. But the common good is not an objective
foundation for constitutional adjudication or political action, but an interpretive concept. As such, its meaning, while determinate in concrete contexts,
remains open to questioning and to dialogue.
INTRODUCTION

Pluralism has dominated American political and constitutional
thought since shortly after the Second World War. Drawing on Lockean
liberalism for theoretical support, pluralists conceive of politics as a
conflict amongst free and atomistic individuals who struggle to maximize
the satisfaction of their preexisting private interests. The relativity of
values is sacrosanct: the only standard of political conduct is whether
one's personal viewpoint is acceptable in the political arena.' In the
Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. I thank Steve Smith,
Mark Tushnet, Frank Michelman, Tom Arnold, Johnny Parker, Dennis Bires, Hideyuki
Ohsawa, and Laura Feldman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the
Faculty Summer Development Fellowship Program of the University of Tulsa for its
financial support.
1.
One current theoretical manifestation of pluralism is public choice theory,
which is the application of economic theory to political decision making. See DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878-79 (1987); see, e.g., Jonathon
*
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1980s, however, constitutional theorists rediscovered the republican roots
of American political thought. 2 The nascent "republican revival"' 3currently one of the most significant movements in constitutional
jurisprudence-emphasizes that citizens, rather than being isolated and

independent, belong to and participate in a political community. Within
that community, the dominant activity is not to aggrandize political
power, but to deliberate-to partake in a political dialogue that ideally
ends in the pursuit of a common or public good, not the mere satisfaction
of private interests."
Meanwhile, another movement is simultaneously progressing in
constitutional theory. The "interpretive turn"5 in jurisprudence owes its
historical development in part to the pluralism of the postwar era. Since
the legislative process is viewed in pluralistic theory as a largely unprincipled clash of private interests, constitutional scholars have reasoned that
the Supreme Court should exercise judicial review to inject principles and

ethical values, which would otherwise be lacking, into our governmental
R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265
(1990). Gary Becker writes: "The economic approach to political behavior assumes that
actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to further
their own interests." Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups
for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983). Becker adds: "Just as managers
of firms are hired to further the interests of owners, so too are politicians and bureaucrats
assumed to be hired to further the collective interests of pressure groups, who fire or
repudiate them by elections and impeachment when they deviate excessively from these
interests." Id. at 396; accord Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976).
2.
Before the rediscovery of republicanism, most constitutional scholars built
their theories on a foundation of pluralist political theory. See Stephen M. Feldman,
Exposing Sunstein's Naked Preferences, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1335 [hereinafter Feldman,
Exposingl; infra notes 137-56. For criticisms of these theories, see Stephen M. Feldman,
An Interpretation of Max Weber's Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron
Cage of ConstitutionalLaw, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 205 (1991) [hereinafter Feldman,
Weber's Theory of Law] (criticizing process-based constitutional theories); Stephen M.
Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Feldman, Whose Common Good?] (racism interferes with the
rational pursuit of self interest, thus undermining pluralistic political theories).
3.
See, e.g., Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L. J. 1493
(1988).

4.

The key books that precipitated the republican revival in constitutional

jurisprudence were BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); JOHN G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975);
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
5.
See, e.g., INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER

(Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); InterpretationSymposium, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium." Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
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system. 6 The Court, however, must ultimately derive those principles
and values from an interpretation of the Constitution-the Justices must
not merely impose their private preferences upon society. Consequently,
constitutional scholars eventually focused on the process of interpretation
itself-how it occurs and how it is constrained. 7 These scholars discovered that an extensive body of literature on interpretation had been
developing in many other fields, ranging from literary criticism to the
history of science.8 As the constitutional scholars realized that they could
apply the insights from these other fields to interpretive problems in
constitutional law, the interpretive turn arrived in jurisprudence.
Interpretivists now argue that all of our practices, including constitutional
adjudication, are interpretive: we are always situated within interpretive
communities and traditions that simultaneously constrain and enable our
understanding of texts and text-analogues.9

Both of these leading movements in constitutional jurisprudence-the
republican revival and the interpretive turn-currently face serious
challenges. Critics of the republican revival charge that republicanism,
by emphasizing the community and a common good, invites the oppression and silencing of divergent voices within society. Individual interests
might be sacrificed to a coercive societal consensus bordering on
authoritarianism."0 Critics of the interpretive turn, in the meantime,
charge that interpretivism lacks the standards necessary for the criticism
of judicial decisions. Interpretivism, in short, lacks critical bite and thus
threatens to corrupt our understanding of the judicial process.
The purpose of this Article is first to identify and to highlight
significant yet previously unrecognized intertwining threads of the
republican revival and the interpretive turn. Then, by strengthening these
already existing threads of commonality, the two movements are woven
together into a whole-a republican interpretivism. Republican interpretivism is both a republican and an interpretive theory: its interpretive
6.

Alexander Bickel provided the classic statement of this approach.

See

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986).

7.
See e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN.
L. REV. 703 (1975).
8.
See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); THOMAS
S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); INTERPRETIVE
SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1979).

9.
See Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in
Jurisprudence,76 IOWA L. REV. 661 (1991); Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism:
Law as Practiceand Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 983-95 (1990).
10.
See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988).
11.
See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The InterpretiveTurn in Modern Theory: A Turn
for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989). For a critique of Moore's position, see
Feldman, supra note 9.
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component responds to the critical charges leveled against other republican theories, while its republican component responds to the charges
brought against most other interpretivist theories. More specifically, in
the context of American politics and constitutional jurisprudence, the
common good of republicanism provides the standard or critical bite
otherwise lacking in interpretivist theory, but interpretivism reveals that
the common good is an interpretive concept that invites dialogue and the
opening, not the closing, of the community to divergent voices."
Part I of this Article traces the development of the republican
revival, 3 while Part II explores the emergence of the interpretive
turn. 14 Part III identifies and explores the overlaps between republicanism and interpretivism" and then argues that the two movements can be
combined in a manner so that each will enrich the other. 6 Part III concludes with a discussion of the recent dispute over flag desecration to
illustrate how republican interpretivism might operate as a theory of
constitutional adjudication and political action. 7
I. REPUBLICAN REVIVAL

Two different and opposed narratives potentially explain the dominance that pluralism has enjoyed in American political theory since World
War II. The first narrative, which pluralists themselves typically offer,
derives pluralism directly from the political thought of the framers,
particularly their supposed commitment to Lockean liberalism. The
second narrative explains pluralism instead as a historical phenomenon
rooted more strongly in the development of twentieth century intellectual
thought than in the framers' political thought. According to this latter
explanation, as developed in this Section, pluralism represents a contingent political manifestation of the modern commitment to scientific
12.
1 do not claim that the common good can provide a criterion for judgment in
contexts other than American politics and constitutional jurisprudence. For example, in
literature, one probably would not evaluate competing interpretations of a Shakespearean
sonnet by asking which reading promotes the common good. See generally Charles Fried,
Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARV. L. REv. 751
(1987) (on how to interpret Shakespeare). But the republican revival persuasively argues
that the common good is, in the context of American constitutional jurisprudence and
political action, the proper criterion of judgment. See infra text accompanying notes 18136 (on republican revival); cf. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv.
104, 110-11 (1989) (what matters is not merely having some constraint on interpretation,
but having the proper kind of constraint).
See infra text accompanying notes 18-136.
13.
14.
See infra text accompanying notes 137-99.
15.
See infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
16.
See infra text accompanying notes 203-28.
17.
See infra text accompanying notes 229-67.
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empiricism and ethical relativism. Contrary to the pluralists' claims, the
framers were influenced by many diverse political thinkers-not only
Locke but also the seminal republican theorists, Aristotle and Machiavelli.
The republican revival arises from the recognition of the republican
underpinnings of American constitutional thought and the related historical
deconstruction of the privileged position long occupied by pluralism.
To understand the location of pluralism in twentieth century thought,
one must begin with the dramatic transformation of intellectual thought
that unfolded during the early twentieth century." The late nineteenth
century had been dominated by formalism-an unshakable acceptance of
the powers of logic, abstraction, and deduction as the means to understanding society and its parts.' In jurisprudence, the preeminence of
formalism was manifest in the prestige of the classical orthodoxy of
Langdell and his followers. According to classical orthodoxy, legal
science is a means to the logical discovery of objective and absolute legal
rules and principles. The entire legal system is neatly ordered into a
conceptual framework resembling a pyramid, with a few axiomatic and
abstract principles at the apex and more precise and numerous rules at the
base of the pyramid. The lower-level rules are derived from the top-level
principles through a process of non-controversial deductive reasoning.'
In the early twentieth century, however, a mounting emphasis on
empiricism, particularism, and functionalism besieged the dominance of
formalism, in law as well as in other fields.2 By the 1920s and 1930s,
the increasingly important social sciences had rejected formal reasoning,
conceptual frameworks, and abstract theorizing as means to knowledge;
social scientists turned instead to the empirical study of particular or
concrete human actions and how those actions served certain functions
within society. Human behavior no longer appeared to result from
rational choice, rather people seemed more idiosyncratic, controlled by
obscure forces such as the unconscious and the economic structures of
society.'
18.
See MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA (1976).
19.
See id. at 11.
20.
See C. C. LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS at viii-ix (2d ed. 1879) (preface
to 1st ed.); C. C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 15-21 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co., 2d ed. 1980) (discussion of the mailbox rule focusing on a purely logical
solution to the problem, expressly disregarding justice); see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, 1 A
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 147-49 (1916).
An excellent discussion of classical orthodoxy is in Thomas C. Grey, LangdeU's
Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
21.
See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973);
WHITE, supra note 18.
22.
See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 3-73; WHITE, supra note 18. Purcell
summarizes the attitudes of the new social and behavioral scientists in the phrase,
"scientific naturalism." See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 3-12.
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A growing ethical and cultural relativism accompanied this rise of the
empirical social sciences.' The collapse of formalism meant that values
could no longer be derived from abstract reasoning and that ethics could
no longer be grounded on absolute principles. Values appeared instead
to arise out of the concrete and particular vagaries of human experiences.
By the 1930s, intellectuals found it difficult to justify any set of moral
values or cultural tenets over any others.' All values and cultures had
equal claims to validity (and invalidity).
In jurisprudence, the American legal realism of the 1920s and 1930s
starkly illustrated the related rises of empiricism and ethical relativism. 5
The classical orthodox claims to the logical discovery of absolute legal
principles yielded to the realist charges that legal principles are "transcendental nonsense."' According to the realists, judges decide cases based
on intuitive hunches, not abstract reasoning,27 and judges' hunches are
influenced by arbitrary yet concrete factors such as the hair color of a
witness, the nasal twang of an attorney, or the breakfast the judge
happened to eat that morning.2" Thus, only empirical studies that focus
on the observable behavior of legal actors lead to any legitimate
understanding of the legal system."
The rise of ethical and cultural relativism presented a serious
challenge to democratic theory in the 1930s. Intellectuals questioned the
ability of the public to discuss and to decide political issues rationally:
if illegitimate prejudices and demagogic symbols sway most people, then
from a political standpoint, most citizens act irrationally.' Politics,
consequently, becomes a matter of raw power since political decisions
result from no more than the interplay of interests in the particular and
PURCELL, supra note 21, at 40-42.
24.
See id. at 69-73.
25.
See id. at 74-94.
26.
Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). For a discussion of Cohen's realist jurisprudence and its
influence on American Indian law, see Stephen M. Feldman, Felix S. Cohen and His
Jurisprudence:Reflections on Federal Indian Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 479 (1986).
27.
Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch'

23.

in JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929); accordMax Radin, The Theory

of JudicialDecision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357 (1925).
28.
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
29.
See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). A scientific wing of American legal realism
sought to describe legal institutions through the methods of social science. Legal rules
and principles might be irrelevant to judicial decision making, but, according to these
realists, careful observation would reveal other stimuli that cause predictable judicial
responses. See, e.g., Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal and Institutional
Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts-Ill. The Connecticut Studies, 40
YALE L.J. 752 (1931).
30.
See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 112-14.
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concrete circumstances."

Moreover, the international ascent of totalitar-

ianism towards the end of the decade raised this challenge to democratic
theory to the level of a crisis. The events of the world rendered a firm
belief in democracy a necessity, yet developments in intellectual thought
over the previous decades had severely weakened the theoretical supports
of free government. The common good of classical republicanism plainly
could not sustain democracy: theorists perceived the common good to be
an absolute and objective value. 2 In a relativist world, acceptance of the
concept of the common good was thus impossible, and some even equated
the common good with the authoritarianism of the Nazis." Intellectuals
were forced to ask the definitive question: if all values are relative, then
what justifies a preference for democracy over totalitarianism?'
Intellectuals responded to this crisis in the 1940s and 1950s by
developing the theory of American pluralism.35 While only a few years
earlier, the relativity of values threatened to disarm democracy, the same
relativism now became the theoretical foundation for free government.
A society must constantly choose what substantive values to endorse and
thus what ends to pursue. But since values are relative, the pluralists
argued, then the only legitimate method for choosing amongst disparate
values is the democratic process.' Society cannot appeal to an Archimedean point to confirm its choices because no such ultimate criterion
exists. In short, there is no standard of validity higher than acceptance by
the people in the political arena.
Pluralists therefore viewed the political process as a legitimate battle
between competing interest groups, all of whom bring preexisting and
31.

See id. at 96.

32.

See,

e.g., JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER,

CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND

DEMOCRACY 250 (3d ed. 1950). Schumpeter wrote: "Mhis common good implies
definite answers to all questions so that every social fact and every measure taken or to
be taken can unequivocally be classed as 'good' or 'bid.'" Id.
33.
See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 202. Joseph Schumpeter wrote:
There is . . . no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all
people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational
argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want
things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact
that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean
different things.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 32, at 251.
34.
See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 138.
35.
See id. at 235-66; Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Sey-Interest in
the Explanationof PoliticalLife, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 8-9 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
1990).
36.
Cf SCHUMPETER, supra note 32, at 242 (emphasizing that democracy is a
means for arriving at decisions).
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largely irrational values to the political arena.37 Interest groups attempt
to form coalitions, to compromise, and otherwise to gather political support in an unprincipled struggle to satisfy their own desires by influencing
or controlling legislators.3" Individuals, interest groups, and legislators
never consider a community interest or common good; Robert Dahl
typified this perspective when he wrote, "If unrestrained by external

checks, any given individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over
others." 39 The results of political battles therefore matter less than the
process itself: the process legitimates the results.'

Values are relative,

but democracy must continue.41
Nevertheless, many pluralists believed that-despite the relativity of
values-a basic cultural agreement or consensus is necessary for
democracy to operate.42 Although various individuals and interest
groups might clash in political struggles, they must agree on certain
elementary cultural norms to prevent the society from splintering into
embittered fragments. 3 However relative those cultural norms might
be, pluralists saw an American society fundamentally and harmoniously
37.
See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, supra note 32, at 250-64 (questioning the
independence and rationality of individuals). " Schumpeter wrote that politics is a
"competitive struggle for political power." Id. at 283; accord id. at 269.
More recently, Benjamin Barber has noted that the prototypical liberal individual is
rational but driven by base desires, and thus unable to use rationality for anything but selfsatisfaction. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 22-24 (1984).
38.
See, e.g., V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (4th ed.
1958) (emphasizing politics as the exercise of power, and discussing the role played by
pressure groups in that exercise of power); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS (1951) (extensive study of the functioning and influence of political interest
groups); see also BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING (1954) (social group identification and its influence on voting); ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER
(1960) (study of the dynamics of social groups and the influence of group identification
on American voters).
39.
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 6 (1956).
40.
This emphasis on governmental processes was especially strong in jurisprudence during the 1950s and 1960s in the legal process school, which was spearheaded by
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tentative ed.
1958). For a discussion of the transition from realism to legal process, see G. Edward
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: JurisprudentialCriticism and Social
Change, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978).
41.
See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 254-72. Benjamin Barber defines pluralism
as follows: "[Piluralist democracy resolves public conflict in the absence of an
independent ground through bargaining and exchange among free and equal individuals
and groups, which pursue their private interests in a market setting governed by the social
contract." BARBER, supra note 37, at 143 (emphasis omitted).
42.
See PURCELL, supra note 21, at 231, 252-56.
43.
See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, supra note 32, at 290 (democracy thrives in only
particular social situations).
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joined in a cultural consensus celebrating individual liberty and freedom.' Democracy is possible in the American culture because all agree
that individuals should have the freedom to express diverse viewpoints.
The uncertainty of values and the tentativeness of truth allow democracy
to flourish in America because compromise and "unreflective practicality"'45 become prerequisites to the very possibility of political action.'
Thus, the dominance of pluralism is explained through this historical
narrative of intellectual thought during the twentieth century. In
summary, early in this century, formalism came under heavy attack until
it succumbed to empiricism and its corollary, ethical relativism. Ethical
relativism, together with the ascent of totalitarianism, created a crisis for
democratic theory. The resolution of this crisis in the postwar era came
in the form of a relativist theory of democracy-namely, pluralism. Of
course, this historical explanation for the rise of pluralism was not the
justification that the pluralists themselves offered when they defended
their theory and its dominance. The political theorists instead justified
pluralism by rooting it in the thought of the framers and the framers'
supposed embrace of Lockean liberalism.
Louis Hartz, in particular, most vigorously argued that the American
society and Constitution are Lockean. In fact, according to Hartz, the
most distinctive quality of American constitutionalism is its unmitigated
devotion to Lockean principles.47 Hartz argued that the fundamental
assumption of both Lockean and American constitutional thought is that
free and atomistic individuals existing in a state of nature join together to
form a political community for the protection of their preexisting rights.
And the foremost preexisting right is liberty." From this vision of the
For example, Robert Dahl wrote: "To assume that this country has remained
44.
democratic because of its Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation;
it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our
society is essentially democratic." DAHL, supra note 39, at 143. Likewise, Louis Hartz
argued that America was marked by a moral unanimity that simultaneously allowed or
included conflict. Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 14-20 (1955).
That unanimity, according to Hartz, allowed Americans to see certain norms as selfevident. See id. at 58-59, 85-86, 134. To Hartz, the "master assumption of American
political thought . . . [was] the reality of atomistic social freedom." Id. at 62.
45.
PURCELL, supra note 21, at 253.
46.
See id. at 235-66.
47.
Hartz succinctly captured his vision of the cultural tradition of America in his
statement: "Burke equaled Locke in America .... " HARTZ, supra note 44, at 156. This
view of America as being ultimately rooted in Lockean liberalism remains in vogue with
many current commentators. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); THOMAS
L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988).
48.
See HARTZ, supra note 44, at 59-62; see also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 271-77 (1962) (rooting concept of
possessive individualism in Locke and arguing that it accurately describes modem
American society, even if it presents theoretical problems).
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origins of the Constitution, postwar theorists saw pluralism as the
inevitable descriptive and prescriptive picture of American politics. If
society is inherently individualistic, then politics should be no more than
the pursuit of the satisfaction of one's own desires.49
Two major difficulties critically weaken this defense of pluralism.
First, Locke's political thought is more complex than the pluralists
acknowledged, and second, many political theorists other than Locke
influenced the framers as they constructed our constitutional government.
With regard to Locke, the pluralists correctly characterized his state of
Locke argued that each individual enjoys
nature as individualistic.
"perfect freedom"' in the state of nature, an "uncontrollable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions."" Despite this freedom, the state

of nature entails fear and uncertainty,52 and individuals therefore
consent 53 to join political society for the "mutual preservation" of
property,' where property means one's natural right to "life, liberty,
and estate."55 Locke continued, however, by declaring repeatedly that
5
'
the end of government is the "public good" or "common good."
Moreover, Locke added that seeking to satisfy one's "private ends" is the
opposite of acting for the public good. 5' Hence, while the pluralists
accurately found in Locke strong doses of individualism and natural rights

preexisting the state-the hallmarks of liberalism-they overlooked a perhaps equally strong measure of the republican common good.5 9 Locke

Attributing the axioms of the framers' constitutional thought even more to
49.
Hobbes than to Locke, Robert Dahl wrote that the framers believed the following:
Men are instruments of their desires. They pursue their desires to satiation if
given the opportunity. One such desire is the desire for power over other
individuals, for not only is power directly satisfying but it also has great
instrumental value because a wide variety of satigfactions depend upon it.
DAHL, supra note 39, at 8.
50.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT 4 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952).
id. at 5. Locke also wrote that people are "by nature, all free equal, and
51.
independent." Id.at 54.
See id. at 70-71.
52.
See id. at 54-55, 65.
53.
54.
Id. at 71; accord id.at 123-24.
55.
Id. at 48; accord id. at 71, 98-99.
56.
See id.at 8,50, 63-64, 73, 75, 76, 81-83, 88-95, 112-13, 118, 124-25, 136.
Id.at 73. Locke also wrote that "the end of government [is] the good of the
57.
community." Id. at 93.
Id. at 92; accord id. at 112.
58.
59.
See, e.g., HARTZ, supra note 44, at 46 (abruptly dismissing the importance
of republican theory to American revolutionaries); cf.Stephen Holmes, The Secret History
of Self-Interest, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 285 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990)
(According to Locke, "Proper interests are those that are compatible with 'the general
Good' of all.").
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does not support a political theory that encourages an unprincipled
struggle to gratify one's own desires.
Furthermore, Locke was but one of many political theorists who
influenced the framers' constitutional thought. From the perspective of
the republican revival, the most important theorists were Aristotle and
Machiavelli, who provided the definitive statements of classical and
Renaissance republican thought.' According to Aristotle's political
writings, 6' the good of the political community and the good of the
individual are inseparable. The telos or natural end of human life is
eudaimonia or happiness, and one achieves happiness by living a life in
accordance with virtue.62 Since Aristotle emphasized that "man is by
nature a political animal"-that is, the state or political community
stands prior to the individual-one cannot live virtuously unless living and
acting prudently and sagaciously within a political community."

Aristotle wrote that in "the best regime, [the citizen] is one who is
capable of and intentionally chooses being ruled and ruling with a view
to the life in accordance with virtue. "' Furthermore, regardless of what
form of government exists-whether a government of the one, the few,
or the many-the best government, according to Aristotle, is the one that
seeks the common interest or good, not private interests.' And at least
in aristocratic and constitutional governments-that is, respectively,
governments of the few and the many that pursue the common good-the

60.
See POCOCK, supra note 4. The influences of Aristotle, Machiavelli and
Locke were not always direct; sometimes the framers read other theorists who had interpreted the more seminal thinkers. See POCOCK, supra note 4; MORTON WHITE,
PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987). Moreover, I do not
mean to suggest that Aristotle, Machiavelli and Locke were the only seminal theorists to
influence the framers. For example, Montesquieu's thought on separation of powers was
important, see MONTESQUiEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS at bk. XI, ch. 6 (Anne M.
Cohler et al. trans. and ed., 1989), as was Hume's thought on how factions arise most
easily in smaller republics, see DAVID HUME, Of Parties in General, in ESSAYS: MORAL,
POLITICAL AND LITERARY 54 (1963).
61.
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (I. Bywater trans.), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]; ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Carnes Lord trans.,

1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS]. For a summary of Aristotle's political
thought, see Carnes Lord, Aristotle, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 118-54 (Leo
Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
62.
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 61, at bk. I.
63.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, supra note 61, at bk. I, ch. 2.
64.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 61, at bk. VI, ch. 1-3;
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, supra note 61, at bk. I, ch. 2.
65.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, supra note 61, at bk. III, ch. 13.
66.
Id. at bk. III, ch. 7.
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common interest is determined through deliberation or community
dialogue.67 In short, a political community is not a mere alliance of
individuals that facilitates private economic exchanges and provides
security, rather the political community exists to allow citizens to live
virtuously."

Although Aristotle claimed that politics is a practical science, ' his
writings reveal an important undercurrent of universalism or
objectivism.7 For example, Aristotle wrote that the greatest of virtues
in political society is justice,7 and justice is in part natural, "that which
everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking
this or that."' This undercurrent occasionally surfaces in potentially
oppressive forms. Aristotle argued, for instance, that a political community is a partnership of individuals who share a certain perception of the
good life or the common interests of the community. 3 This picture of
a community defined by a shared consensus of the good life suggests that
some individuals-at least those who do not share in the consensus-are
not entitled to participate in political deliberations. And indeed, Aristotle
argued that some individuals are by nature "marked out for subjection,

others for rule."74 Thus, unsurprisingly, Aristotle believed that the best
regime is the aristocracy-a government of the few in the pursuit of the
common good."

67.

Id. at bk. IV, ch. 14. The importance of deliberation is more evident in the

dialogical writings of Plato. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, reprintedin THE REPUBLIC AND
OTHER WORKS 7 (B. Jowett trans., 1973).
68.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, supra note 61, at bk. III, ch. 9. Aristotle wrote:
"For the city is not any chance multitude, but one self-sufficient with a view to
life ....
" Id. at bk. VII, ch. 8. Jowett translated this same passage as follows: "For a
state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but . . . a union of them sufficing for the
purposes of life .... ." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (B. Jowett trans.), in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2108 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
69.
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 61, at bk. I, ch. 3.
70.
See POCOCK, supra note 4, at 21-22 (1975).
71.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 61, at bk. V, ch. 1.
72.
Id. at bk. V, ch. 7.
73.
Aristotle wrote: "For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals
that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of this
sort]; and partnership in these things is what makes a household and a city." ARISTOTLE,
THE POLITICS, supra note 61, at bk. I, ch. 2.
74.
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS at bk. i, ch. 5 (B. Jowett trans.), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1990 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). Some modern
theorists argue that Aristotle's sexism warps his entire political philosophy. See Sandra
Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka, Introduction, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE at xi-xii (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).
75.
See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, supra note 61, at bk. VII-VIII. Moreover,
according to Aristotle, some can be so completely excluded that they can be justifiably
enslaved. See id. at bk. 1, ch. 5.
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Machiavelli continued many of the themes from Aristotelian thought,
but added a hard, cynical tone. 76 As was true of Aristotle, Machiavelli

believed that politics is an eminently practical topic' and that the best
governments, regardless of their forms, seek the common good, not
private interests.78

Machiavelli, however, preferred a republic over a

monarchy-he suggested that the people can best maintain a political order-but he nonetheless also stated that humans are ignobleby nature.' Consequently, according to Machiavelli, human nature together
with sheer fortune doom all forms of government to eventual ruin."'
The tension between political order and fortune-and the resultant struggle

to maintain the fragile political community-was a constant theme for
Machiavelli:' he redefined virtue as the (at least temporary) overcoming of fortune. Virtue thus became for Machiavelli the "judicious alternation" of Aristotelian virtue and vice: the political leader, for example,
must at times exercise liberality with money, but at other times must

exercise miserliness; the political leader must at times display compassion,
but at other times must act cruelly; and so on."
According to
Machiavelli, a political leader's most important goal must be the
76.
See NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS
Livius, reprinted in 1 MACHIAVELLI: THE CHIEF WORKS AND OTHERS 175 (Allan
Gilbert trans., 1965) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES]; NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI,
THE PRINCE, reprinted in 1 MACHIAVELLI: THE CHIEF WORKS AND OTHERS 5-96 (Allan
Gilbert trans., 1965) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE]. For a summary of
Machiavelli's thought, see Leo Strauss, Niccolo Machiavelli, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 296 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
77.
Thus, the theme of The Prince was how a prince can maintain a state through
the use of any available means. See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, supra note 76.
78.
See MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES, supra note 76, at bk. I, ch. 2.
79.
Machiavelli argued that a republic is likely to be more resilient than a
princedom because the republic can draw more readily upon the diversity of its citizens.
Id. at bk. I, ch. 9; see id. at bk. I, ch. 20, 59; cf id. at bk. I, ch. 2 (the best government
is a mixture of government by the one, the few, and the many).
80.
Machiavelli wrote that people are by nature bad or vicious. See, e.g.,
MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, supra note 76, at ch. 18; MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES, supra
note 76, at bk. 1, ch. 3. Thus, according to Machiavelli, a prince is better to be feared
than loved. See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, supra note 76, at ch. 17.
81.
See MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES, supra note 76, at bk. I, ch. 2.
Fortune stands for the random changes of the world that are, for the most part,
beyond human control. See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, supra note 76, at chs. 7, 25.
82.
This Machiavellian theme became the basis for Pocock's concept of the
"Machiavellian moment." See POCOCK, supra note 4.
83.
Strauss, supra note 76, at 301.
84.
See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, supra note 76, at chs. 15-19.
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preservation of the state or political community, and that overarching goal

justifies the use of any means necessary."
The constitutional thought of the framers resonated with republican
tones that emanated from Aristotle and Machiavelli.' Most important,
the framers emphasized repeatedly that the purpose of government is to
pursue the public or common good of the political community." And
according to the framers, that public good might, at times, be inconsistent
with the private interests of individual citizens and governmental
officials.8" Furthermore, in The Federalist, Publius mentioned-but did
not emphasize-that Americans possess sufficient virtue to maintain selfgovernment' and that our governmental leaders should be imbued with
85.
Machiavelli wrote that "the end justifies the means." NICCOLMACMAVELLI,
THE PRINCE (Luigi Ricci and E.R.P. Vincent trans.), reprintedin"SOCIAL AND POLmCAL
PHILOSOPHY: READINGS FROM PLATO TO GHANDi 123 (John Somerville & Ronald E.
Santoni eds., 1963). Allan Gilbert translates the same passage as follows: "As to the
actions of all men and especially those of princes, against whom charges cannot be
brought in court, everybody looks at their result." MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, supra
note 76, at ch. 18.
86.
Even more so than for either Aristotle or Machiavelli, political thinking was
a practical enterprise for the framers; they were, after all, writing an actual constitution.
87.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). For example, Madison wrote:
mhe public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the
supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has
any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were
the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would
be, Reject the plan.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Publius occasionally refers to the public happiness as the end of government, see,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 191 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 380 (probably James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961),
but the public happiness is then equated with the public good. See THE FEDERALIST No.
45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 432
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
The constitutional text states that the Constitution and the government should
promote and provide for the "general welfare." U.S. CONST. pmbl; U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 1; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (laws for
the "public good").
88.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 40 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 231 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (framers rose
above usual private and partial interests for the public good).
89.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also WHITE, supra note 60, at 91-99.
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civic virtue so that they will naturally pursue the public good.'

This

form of virtue is Aristotelian in nature: one must act prudently, sagacious-'
ly, and for the good of one's political community. The framers,
moreover, believed themselves to be exercising civic virtue as they
deliberated-as Aristotle had recommended-about the common good of

America and how that common good should be embodied and protected
in a constitution. 91.
While Aristotelian virtue is but a peripheral theme for the framers,
echoes of a more Machiavellian virtue sound more strongly in constitutional thought.'
Despite acknowledging that Americans are virtuous
enough to have self-government,' Publius often characterized humans

as base and greedy creatures who tend to band into factions that constantly threaten the ends and security of republican government.' The
purpose of the Constitution, consequently, became the structuring of a
stable government that would act for the public good despite the
ignobleness of human nature and the resultant fragility of the republic.

5

Just as Machiavelli had emphasized a tension between political order and
fortune, the framers emphasized a tension between political order and faction-where a faction was any group, whether a minority or a majority,
90.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALIST No. 63, at 390 (probably James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Herbert Storing argued that civic virtue was only a "peripheral problem" for the
Federalists. See HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 74
(1981).
91.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 231 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Herbert Storing wrote:
The Constitution of the United States was viewed by the founding generation
as distinctive, even unique, in the extent to which it was the product of
deliberation. Most previous foundings seemed to have been the result of
chance or the edict of one all-powerful man. But the United States Constitution was framed by a numerous and diverse body of statesmen, sitting for over
three months; it was widely, fully, and vigorously debated in the country at
large; and it was adopted by (all things considered) a remarkably open and
representative procedure.
STORING, supra note 90, at 3.

92.
See POCOCK, supra note 4, at 462-552.
93.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison),(Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
94.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (factions occur because "men are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (faction is
ordinary to the operation of government); THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 523-24 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (people are imperfect).
95.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.").
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that opposed the public good.'

Madison's simultaneous expressions of

hope and distrust in The Federalist, Number 57, captured the cynicism of
Machiavellian virtue:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to
be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of the society; and in the next place, to
take the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public

trust.

97

Hence, the framers were often concerned with traditional republican
themes-the political community, the common good within that community, deliberation about the common good, and virtue-and therefore
unsurprisingly, some disturbing aspects of earlier republican thought also

surfaced in American constitutional thinking. In particular, the undercurrent of objectivism that appeared in Aristotelian theory becomes stronger
and clearer in the framers' thought, reflecting the firm epistemological

belief in objectivity that typified the eighteenth century." The framers
thus conceived of the common good as objective-as the "true interest"
of the people that was somehow "out there"'' 0yet knowable, external yet
perceptible to individual minds.' 0 1 'In The Federalist, Number 10,
Madison consequently equates the common good with "thepermanentand

aggregate interests of the community.""°
96.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison wrote: "To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such

a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government,
is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally POCOCK, supra note
4, at 545-46 (the "Machiavellian moment" in American constitutional thought).
97.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787) reprinted in
I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 644-47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
98.

99.
1961).
100.
101.

See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).

THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
WHITE, supra note 60, at 120.
See PANGLE, supra note 47, at 29; WHITE, supra note 60, at 118-20, 189.

102.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added); accord THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 383 (probably James Madison)

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (equates public good with the "collective and permanent welfare" of the country); letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787)
reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 647 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
ed., 1987) (contrasting private interests with "the general and permanent good of the
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The concept of an objective common good led to elitist and conserva-

tive strains in the framers' constitutional thought. Publius occasionally
suggested that certain individuals are more capable than others of
perceiving the true interests of the people-the objective common

good-and those most virtuous people ideally should be elected to
governmental offices." ° Then, pushing this argument even further,
PubliUs reasoned that some groups of people-namely, women and
African-American slaves-are so incapable of perceiving the public good
that they can be justifiably excluded from the deliberations within the
political community." 4 Once these diverse voices were politically
silenced, Publius could observe that the (remaining) American people

were unusually homogeneous. °5 This vision of a political community
distinguished by consensus amongst members and closure to all others
further reflected the Aristotelian roots of American constitutional
thought. 06
The modern republican revival in constitutional jurisprudence evolves

largely from the recognition that the roots of American constitutional
thought range at least as deeply into republicanism as they extend into
Lockean liberalism.'0 7 Moreover, the foregoing narrative of twentieth
century intellectual thought reinforces a renewed interest in republicanism:
if pluralism is understood as a unique historical phenomenon of twentieth
whole").
103.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961 ); THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961 ); cf MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 257-72
(1978) [hereinafter WHITE, PHILOSOPHY] (elitism of American revolutionaries); WHITE,
supra note 60, at 125-27 (elitism of framers). Gordon Wood wrote: "The Constitution
was intrinsically an aristocratic document designed to check the democratic tendencies of
the period .... .' WOOD, supra note 4, at 513.
104.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 336-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); cf WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 103, at 266-67 (elitism was important
element leading to disenfranchisement of many groups in Constitution).
105.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).'
106.
But cf. PANGLE, supra note 47, at 46-47 (arguing that Publius rejected the
pressure to conform that typified classical republicanism).
107.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 35-48 (1985) (emphasizing the republican thought of the framers).
Political scientists and economists also are challenging with empirical evidence the
current manifestation of pluralism, public choice theory. See Farber & Frickey, supra
note 1, at 895-901; see, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology
in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984) (the altruistic and
publicly interested goals of political actors are empirically important to governmental
processes). For a collection of essays rejecting the view that humans are always
motivated by self-interest, see BEYOND SELF-INTEREST (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
For a discussion of public choice theory, see supra note 1.
Some pluralists occasionally acknowledged the importance of republican themes to
constitutional thought. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 32, at 267.
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century thought flowing from a rejection of formalism and the related
rises of empiricism and relativism, then the appeal of republicanism
heightens as the luster of pluralism fades. The Constitution can best be
understood as an uncertain blend of republicanism and liberalism;

however, pluralism ignores the important republican component of the
American union." 8 The key figures in the modern republican movement-including Cass Sunstein, " Bruce Ackerman, 1 ' Frank
Michelman," and Owen Fiss2-con sequently stress the republican
108.
It is also important, however, not to ignore the liberal roots of American
constitutional thought. For example, Madison expressly refused to sacrifice individual
liberty in his quest to prevent faction. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78-80 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (judicial review should protect
individual rights). The new republican theorists generally acknowledge the importance
of liberalism. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Preferences and Politics]; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond]
(combining liberalism and republicanism).
Herbert Storing argues that the Anti-federalists also attempted to combine liberalism
and republicariism, while Gordon Wood more strongly characterized the Anti-federalists
as believing in a pure classical republicanism. Compare STORINo, supra note 90 with
WOOD, supra note 4. More recently, Wood has argued that modem theorists often
attempt to force a categorical dichotomy between liberalism and republicanism onto the
framers, but the framers did not so sharply distinguish the two modes of political thought.
The categorical distinction between liberalism and republicanism, in other words, is more
characteristic of twentieth century thought than the framers' thought. Gordon S. Wood,
The Virtues and the Interests, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 1991, at 32-35.
109.
See Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 108; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note
107; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Interference]; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy];
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]; Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics,
supra note 108.
For a criticism of Sunstein's position from an interpretivist perspective, see
Feldman, Exposing, supra note 2.
110.
See Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics. ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE
L.J. 453 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, Constitutional Politics]; Bruce Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter
Ackerman, Storrs Lectures].
Ill.
See Frank i. Michelman, Foreword.Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Foreword];Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic].
112.
See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986)
[hereinafter Fiss, Death]; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword.: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Foreword]. Of the four theorists mentioned in the text,
Fiss is perhaps the one who would be least likely to identify himself categorically as a
new republican. Nonetheless, he clearly pursues republican themes in his work, and I
therefore follow Mark Tushnet's lead by characterizing Fiss as a republican theorist. See
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elements of American constitutionalism and the ramifications of those

elements for our understanding of the Constitution.'
While these republican theorists differ on specific details of how
republicanism should be manifested in constitutional law, they all agree
on the importance of certain traditional republican themes. All four
theorists emphasize that citizens should not be envisioned as free and
atomistic individuals who merely seek to satisfy their own interests, rather
citizens must always be understood to exist within a political community." 4 The central political activity within that community is dialogue:
politics, for the republicans, becomes a deliberative process, not an
unprincipled battle for raw power." 5 And the goal of dialogue within
the political community is to identify the common good." 6 Indeed, the
overarching distinction between pluralistic and republican political
theories lies in their respective visions of the purpose of government. For

pluralism, the purpose of government is the satisfaction of private interests, while for republicanism, the purpose is the pursuit of the common
good.

Interestingly, the traditional republican theme of virtue is at most a
peripheral issue for the new republican theorists-this de-emphasis was
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:

A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 160-68 (1988).

113.

Other theorists who are sympathetic to the republican revival include Sanford

Levinson, see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Mark Tushnet, see

TUSHNET, supra note 112, at 17, 187; and Suzanna Sherry, see Suzanna Sherry, Civic
Virtue andthe Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
114.
See, e.g., Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 110, at 1022. Michelman
emphasizes the concept of paideaia, which is a community's "process of collective
enlightenment of its members through their reflections on their shared cultural inheritance,
and their way of living well through engagement in that process." Michelman, Foreword,
supra note 111, at 13 n.44; see Robert M. Cover, Foreword.: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Sunstein writes that the political process is "one of collective
self-determination." Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 109, at 1694. For a
discussion of the importance of community to republican thought, see Paul W. Kahn,
Community in Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 18-43 (1989). For
a philosophical discussion of how the concept of community undermines liberalism, see
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). See also Mari S.
Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudenceand Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist
Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986) (criticizing Rawls'
individualism from a feminist perspective).
115.
See, e.g., Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 110, at 455, 525;
Fiss, Death, supra note 112, at 8; Fiss, Foreword,supra note 112, at 12-13; Michelman,
Foreword,supra note 111, at 33-36, 75-76; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 111,
at 1524; Sunstein, Naked Preferences,supra note 109, at 1694; Sunstein, Beyond, supra
note 108, at 1548-51.
116.
See, e.g., Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 110, at 1022, 1033;
Sunstein, supra note 107, at 31-32, 58; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 109, at
1690-91.
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also true of the framers' treatment of at least Aristotelian virtue. 17 The
new republican theorists rarely discuss virtue as a definitive ingredient of

modern republicanism. While for traditional republican theories, virtue
was prerequisite to the pursuit of the common good, for the modem
theorists, dialogue within the political community is essential. Although
an Aristotelian type of virtue might facilitate the pursuit of the common

good, to the modern theorist, the promotion of virtue often appears to be
little more than a possible outcome flowing from the pursuit of a
republican form of government. No theorist suggests, however, that
virtue is harmful, rather virtue is simply not an overriding consideration. "'
Although Sunstein, Ackerman, Michelman, and Fiss agree on these

basic republican themes, they differ in their respective reactions to the
weaknesses that have typified previous forms of republicanism.

Thus,

while they all agree that the dialogical pursuit of the common good is
central to republican government, they disagree about who are the principal participants in the dialogue." 9 Sunstein argues that the legislators
are principal;"2 Michelman and Fiss argue that the courts are primary;' 2 ' and Ackerman argues that all of the people participate, though
only at special times of constitutional awareness. z2
As discussed above, Machiavellian virtue played a more important role in the
117.
framers' thought, although they did not expressly discuss it. See supra text accompanying
notes 92-97.
118.
Sunstein writes:
[Clivic virtue should play a role in political life. There is no mystery to this
claim; it refers simply to the understanding that in their capacity as political
actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in
their private interest, but also what will best serve the community in
general ....
Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 108, at 1550.
Michelman, more so than the other republican theorists, focuses somewhat on
virtue. See Michelman, Foreword, supra note 111, at 55-73.
119.
See Kahn, supra note 114, at 18-43; Michelman, Foreword, supra note 111,
at 58-60.
120.
See, e.g., Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 109, at 1699 (legislators
should pursue the public good; the courts police the legislative process to ensure that
legislators do so).
121.
See Fiss, Death, supranote 112, at 8; Michelman, Foreward, supra note 111,
at 65, 74. Michelman, however, has subsequently suggested that the political dialogue
should occur in many forums, not just the courts. See Frank I. Michelman, Bringing the
Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 256, 266 (1989)
(discussing political dialogue in the legislatures); Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note
dialogue").
111, at 1531 (identifying many "arenas of potentially transformative
122.
See Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 110, at 401; Ackerman,
Storrs Lectures, supra note 110.
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Furthermore, all four theorists avoid giving significant content to the
concept of the common good,'2z yet an unmistakable undercurrent of
objectivism flows through the thought of at least Sunstein and Fiss.'"
Sunstein argues that courts should police the legislative process to ensure
that legislators pursue the common good, not "naked preferences."2
Naked preferences, according to Sunstein, are "preexisting private
interests,"'

exogenous to social influences and autonomously chosen

by individuals. 17 To Sunstein then, naked preferences provide neutral
and objective Archimedean points for constitutional adjudication:
supposedly, courts can easily identify naked preferences because they are
raw, simple, and obvious. Without these naked preferences to ground
constitutional decision, Sunstein fears that courts will have "no alternative
position from which to decide cases.""

Fiss argues that the courts must give meaning to our public values-especially constitutional values 1"-by engaging in "a special kind
of dialogue."'' " Fiss insists, however, that the judicial dialogue is so
closely constrained that judges are, in fact, objective; judges cannot
123.
Cf. Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American CommunalLife,
88 MICH. L. REv. 983 (1990) (criticizing new republicans for not giving content to
common good, and then offering the Aristotelian concept of liberality as a possible content).
124.
Michelman currently emphasizes the dialogic component of the civic
republican tradition, see M ichelman, Law's Republic, supra note 111, but he also focused
on an objective character that he sees in the common good. See Frank I. Michelman,
PoliticalMarkets andCommunity Self-Determination: Competing JudicialModels ofLocal
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149 (1977-78); Frank 1. Michelman,
Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 443, 446, 448, 451 (1989); Michelman, Foreword, supra note 111, at 40.
Michael Fitts argues that republican writers are often unclear as to what extent they
believe in an objective morality. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political
Party Perspectiveon Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1567, 1613 & n.147 (1988).
125.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences,supra note 109. Sunstein defines the common
good as "any justification for government action that goes beyond the exercise of raw
political power"-that is, anything other than a naked preference. Id. at 1694.
126.
Id. at 1716.
127.
Sunstein, supra note 107, at 31; Sunstein, Legal Interference, supranote 109;
see Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 109, at 1689.
128.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 109, at 905. Sunstein also discusses
universalism as an aspect of his form of republicanism. Sunstein, Beyond, supra note
108, at 1554-55. For a critique of Sunstein's position, see Feldman, Exposing, supranote
2.
129.
See Fiss, Death, supra note 112, at 8; Fiss, Foreword,supra note 112, at 12, 11, 14, 28-32.
130.
Fiss, Death, supra note 112, at 8.
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merely express "personal beliefs.''
In particular, according to Fiss,
certain "disciplining rules" constrain constitutional interpretation and
provide standards for criticizing judicial decisions. 3 2 Judges can ignore
these rules-for example, by not listening properly to all parties, by not
articulating an opinion, or by not applying neutral principles-but then,
Fiss argues, law no longer differs from politics. 133
These aspects of modern republican theories-the uncertainty about
who participates in the political dialogue, and the undercurrent of
objectivism-lead critics of the republican revival to refocus our attention
on the traditional problems of republicanism. If politics is the pursuit of
the common good, then we must be genuinely concerned that the interests
of some individuals might be ignored for the supposed good of the
community. To facilitate reaching a consensus about the common good,
in other words, some voices might be silenced-especially the voices of
minorities and others who sometimes tend to experience and to perceive
the world differently from the majority. In effect, the political community
will be closed: some will not fully participate in the all-important
dialogue." This fear is especially pronounced when the undercurrent
of objectivism surfaces. 135 If the common good can be found to be
objective, then once it has been identified, the dialogue might as well
end-dissenting voices, according to this view, inevitably belong only to
those who are unable or unwilling to understand the truth. Thus, modern
131.
Fiss, Foreword, supra note 112, at 12-13; accord Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, Objectivity].
132.
Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 184-96 (1985)
[hereinafter Fiss, Conventionalism]; Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 131, at 744-46.
133.
See Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 132, at 194-96; Fiss, Objectivity, supra
note 131, at 754-55.
134.
See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMocRAcY, AND
RoMANCE 155 (1990); Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591
(1988); Bell & Bansal, supra note 10; Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics.: An
Evaluation of Three Best Case Arguments on Behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 Geo.
L.J. 1929, 1939-40 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It
Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism
and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 429-34 (1991); Kahn, supra note 114, at 18-43;
Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 323, 338-42
(1990); cf. Ronald C. Griffin, Republicanism: How Can Blacks Revive a Constitutional
Dream?, 30 How. L.J. 967, 967 (1987) (historically, African Americans have not fared
well under republicanism).
135.
Cf Fitts, supra note 124, at 1613 n.147 (questioning the extent to which the
new republicans endorse objective morality).
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republican theorists face some of the same grave charges that justifiably
plagued earlier republicans from Aristotle to the framers."
II. INTERPRETIVE TURN

A historical narrative describing the interpretive turn in jurisprudence
must embark from postwar pluralism. In particular, much modern
constitutional theory originates with Alexander Bickel, whose early
constitutional thought developed in the 1950s and 1960s. 37 Bickel,
echoing the dominant pluralistic political theory of his era, argued that the
legislative process is a wide-open clash of interests, open to everyone and
controlled by shifting majorities. Legislative actions are largely unprincipled and, at best, reflect the most expedient means for solving problems
and attaining goals.' 38
If, as Bickel argued, the legislative role is to allow the free play of
democracy, then the judicial role is to inject principles into government.
To Bickel, the central commitment of our constitutional government is
democracy. Legislative actions are legitimate because they are democratic: they theoretically represent the will of the majority of the
people. 39 On the other hand, a judicial decision striking down a
legislative act as unconstitutional supposedly defeats the democratic will.
To overcome this "counter-majoritarian difficulty,"'" judicial review
must be justified, according to Bickel, by adding something to government that is otherwise lacking. Since Bickel believed that the legislative
process is pluralistic-and hence unprincipled-he argued that constitutional adjudication should add principles or ethical values to our system.
Consistent with pluralistic political theory, Bickel saw an American
136.
See Feldman, Whose Common Good?, supra note 2 (racism can undermine
the communal dialogue about the common good); Robin West, Foreword. Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 62-63 (1990) (despite the new republicans' claims to
the contrary, civic republicanism does not protect individuals from the pressure of
community homogeneity and conformism). Even some new republican theorists criticize
other new republicans for encouraging elitist, authoritarian or conservative
constitutionalism.

See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 112, at 164-66; Michelman, Law's

Republic, supra note III, at 1520 (criticizing Ackerman); James G. Pope, Republican
Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 287, 295-304 (1990).
137.
See BICKEL, supra note 6.
138.
Id. at 24-25, 225-26; see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 37 & n.* (1978).
139.
See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 20, 27.
140.
Id. at 16.
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society agreeing on basic cultural' norms; the Supreme Court's function
thus is to enunciate and to apply those "enduring values of our society. 11141

Based on Bickel's definitive vision of constitutional adjudication, the
"problem" of judicial review became the delineation of our enduring
values or, at a minimum, the identification of a method to guide the Court
in its quest for those values.142 Constitutional scholars argued that if the
Court can defeat the democratic will in the name of enduring societal

values, those values must be grounded on some objective source and not
reflect the mere personal preferences of the Justices. Otherwise, the

democratic core of American constitutional government is emptied of sig143
nificance, and society is subject to judicial tyranny.
By the late 1970s, two fundamentally different approaches to the
problem

of judicial .review

had developed:

interpretivism and

noninterpretivism.' 44 Interpretivists argued that only the constitutional
text and the intent of the framers can legitimately ground constitutional
decisions; the Court can strike a legislative act as unconstitutional only if

it is inconsistent with "norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the
141.
Id. at 58. Bickel wrote:
Our point of departure, like Mr. Wechsler's, has been that judicial review is
the principled process of enunciating and applying certain enduring values of
our society. These values must, of course, have general significance and
even-handed application. When values conflict--as they often will-the Court
must proclaim one as overriding, or find an accommodation among them.
The result is a principle, or a new value, if you will, or an amalgam of
values, or a compromise of values; it must in any event also have general
significance and even-handed application. For, again, the root idea is that the
process is justified only if it injects into representative government something
that is not already there; and that is principle, standards of action that derive
their worth from a long view of society's spiritual as well as material needs
and that command adherence whether or not the immediate outcome is
expedient or agreeable. It follows, and I take it Mr. Wechsler suggests, that
once the Court has arrived at a principle, it must apply that principle without
compromise. Therefore, the Court should not rest judgment on a "principle"
which may be incapable of uniform application.
Id. (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959)).
142.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 94-96 (1982).
143.
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2-3 (1977); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 26-29 (1975); PERRY, supra note 142, at 9.

144.

See Grey, supra note 7, at 705-07.
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written Constitution."'' 145 Noninterpretivists, on the other hand, argued
that the text and the intent of the framers are hopelessly ambiguous and
incomplete and must therefore be supplemented by some other source or
sources, such as natural law, tradition, or societal consensus."
According to a natural law proponent, for example, the Court can
theoretically hold a legislative act unconstitutional if the act is inconsistent
with natural rights or justice.'47 Interpretivists responded by arguing
that noninterpretivism merely provides a pretext for bypassing the
Constitution. Constitutional objectivity can come only from the text and
the intent of the framers: if we go beyond those sources, constitutional
adjudication lacks standards and hence cannot be critically evaluated.'"
As Bickel eventually realized and as John Hart Ely so eloquently
stated, ethical relativism-which had spawned the accepted pluralistic
political theory-undermined any vision of judicial review grounded on
a supposedly objective source, whether it be the written text, natural law,
or anything else.' 49 Ely argued that interpretivism as well as the most
commonly accepted forms of noninterpretivism are all indeterminate:
they fail to satisfy their self-imposed mission of providing an objective
source to ground judicial review.'"' Ely's pointed criticism of natural
law applies equally to other noninterpretivist as well as interpretivist
approaches: "The advantage . . . is that you can invoke natural law to
support anything you want. The disadvantage is that everybody
understands that."' 5 ' Interpretivism and noninterpretivism, in Ely's
hands, always sink into a maelstrom of subjectivity: the Supreme Court
145.

JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980); see, e.g., BERGER,

supra note 143, at 247-418. The theory is that judicial review is legitimate when the
Constitution is clear because the Constitution represents, in a sense, the permanent will
of the majority and thus legitimately overrides the temporary will of the majority
represented by ordinary legislative actions. See BERGER, supra note 143, at 45, 363-72;
ELY, supra, at 8-9.

This form of interpretivism is not the same as the thoroughgoing interpretivism that
took hold after the interpretive turn. See infra text accompanying notes 157-99.
146.
For a summary of various noninterpretivist positions, see ELY, supra note
145, at 43-72.
147.
See, e.g., Grey, supra note 7; Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV.
843 (1978).
148.
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
149.
See BICKEL, supra note 138, at 99, 165 (questions the possibility of finding
neutral principles); ELY, supra note 145, at 1-73.
For example, Ely argues that
See ELY, supra note 145, at 1-73.
150.
interpretivists are stymied by historical evidence showing that the framers included several
provisions in the Constitution that suggest that the Court should go beyond the text and
the intent of the framers. See id. at 12-14.
Id. at 50.
151.
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Justices inevitably seem to impose their personal:values on society. This
subjectivism also renders impossible, the evaluation of constitutional
decisions: if all values are relative, how can we legitimately criticize a
Supreme Court decision?
Ely, of course, presented his own solution to the problem of judicial
review: the theory of representation-reinforcement. According to this
theory, the Court is forbidden from choosing substantive values for our
society. The Court is instead limited to policing the processes of
democratic representation and thus can overturn a congressional action as
unconstitutional only if it resulted from a malfunctioning or defective
democratic process. 5 2 The attraction of representation-reinforcement is
that it at least appears to remain doggedly consistent with pluralistic
political theory. If all ethical values are relative, then the Court cannot
possibly find some objective source to ground constitutional adjudication.
Consequently, all substantive value choices in our society should be left
to the legislatures, so long as they strictly follow democratic principles-allowing all citizens a fair opportunity to voice their equally
subjective and relative values. The Court's only legitimate function, then,
is to insure that the legislatures follow those democratic principles." 3
Ely himself did not escape the same criticism that he had leveled
against others: representation-reinforcement theory was, in the end,
indeterminate. Thus, it neither could constrain constitutional adjudication
nor provide critical standards for evaluating Supreme Court decisions."
For example, Ely argued that the Court can police the democratic process
by "facilitating the representation of minorities."'" The determination,
however, of which societal groups constitute minorities deserving of
judicial protection and which groups are simply losers in the democratic
battleground is problematic. The categorization of groups as protected
minorities requires the Court to engage in exactly those unconstrained
substantive value choices that representation-reinforcement theory is
supposed to forbid.'"
Facing the apparent indeterminacy of all theories, constitutional
scholars took a different tack. They began to argue that the initial

152.
See id. at 73-183; cf. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (the role of the Supreme Court in judicial review
revolves around the functioning of the democratic political process).
153.
See ELY, supra note 145, at 49-183.
154.
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 737-40 (1985); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131
(1981); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the -Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980).
155.
ELY, supra note 145, at 135.
156.
See Brest, supra note 154, at 140; see generally Feldman, Weber's Theory
of Law, supra note 2 (process-based constitutional jurisprudence is likely to lead to a

continuing failure to satisfy the substantive needs and values of minorities).
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distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism may have been
misleading; even supposed noninterpretivists always claimed to be
interpreting the Constitution. 15 7 Perhaps, the argument continued,
constitutional adjudication-and indeed, all other adjudication as well-is

always a matter of interpretation.' 58 And if adjudication is always an
interpretive enterprise, then the most promising path for constitutional and
other legal theorists was to investigate the process of interpretation itself.
Consequently, a new central question emerged in jurisprudence: how
does interpretation occur?'59
turn.lo

Jurisprudence thus began its interpretive

Pursuit of an answer to this overriding question of interpretation led
constitutional theorists into fields far outside the legal academy. They
discovered that scholars such as Stanley Fish, a literary critic, 6' and
Hans-Georg Gadamer, a continental philosopher, 62 had already devel157.
See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984); Richard H. Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution,
20 GA. L. REV. 939, 940-41 (1986).
158.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 359-60 (1986); Paul Brest, Who
Decides?, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 661, 661-62 (1985); Grey, supra note 157, at 1; Larry
Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 603, 619-30 (1985); James B. White,
Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835, 836 (1986).
159.
Fred Schauer wrote: "What does it mean to 'interpret' a constitutional
provision? What do we mean when we say that a constitutional provision 'means'
something? . . .Indeed, answers to these questions underlie any theory of constitutional
adjudication .... ." Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 797, 799 (1982).
160.
Compare RONALD DWORKIN,TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (viewed law
from a phenomenological perspective) with DWORKIN,supra note 158 (Dworkin shifted
to viewing law as interpretation). For a discussion of the interpretive turn in general, not
just in jurisprudence, see Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan, The Interpretive Turn:
Emergence of an Approach, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER 1-21 (Paul
Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1979).
161.
See FISH, supra note 8; see, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 131 (relying
on Fish to develop views on law and interpretation); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature,
60 TE.x. L. REV. 373 (1982) (same). But see Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1325 (1984) [hereinafter Fish, Fish v. Fiss] (criticizing how Fiss had interpreted
Fish's works); Stanley Fish, Interpretationand the PluralistVision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 495
(1982) (criticizing how Levinson had interpreted Fish's works).
162.
See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]
(originally published in German in 1960; the first English translation was HANS GEORO
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (W. Glen-Doepel trans., 1975)). For excellent analyses
of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, see GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION, AND REASON (1987); JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD (1985). More and more legal scholars have

been relying explicitly upon Gadamer as they attempt to analyze legal interpretation. See,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
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oped sophisticated theories of interpretation. And most important, these
interpretivist (or hermeneutic) theories promised to resolve or, perhaps,
to dissolve the problem of judicial review. Constitutional theory seemed
locked into a dilemma:

the problem of judicial review, as defined by

Bickel, demanded that constitutional adjudication be based on some
objective foundation, yet every possible foundational theory appeared to
degenerate into a subjective relativism that left adjudication unconstrained
and impossible to criticize. Legal scholars discovered that interpretivism
in other fields had originated from an effort to overcome various formulations of this same dilemma-either we have objective knowledge grounded
on some Archimedean point, or we have unconstrained and subjective

relativism.

Interpretivism, in short, had rejected this either/or of

objectivity or subjectivity."
Interpretivism acknowledges that there is no objective foundation or

Archimedean point to ground interpretation. Neither the text, the author's
intent, nor anything else exists as brute data or, in other words, as an

uninterpreted source of meaning.'" To a thoroughgoing interpretivist,
.609 (1990); Feldman, supra note 9; David C. Hoy, Interpreting the Law.: Hermeneutical
and PoststructuralistPerspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985); Francis J. Mootz III,
The OntologicalBasis ofLegal Hermeneutics:A ProposedModel of Inquiry Based on the
Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988).
163.
Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan write of the interpretive turn:
The interpretive turn refocuses attention on the concrete varieties of cultural
meaning, in their particularity and complex texture, but without falling into
the traps of historicism or cultural relativism in their classical forms. For the
human sciencesboth the object of investigation-the web of language, symbol,
and institutions that constitutes signification-and the tools by which investigation is carried out share inescapably the same pervasive context that is the
human world. All this is by no means to exalt "subjective" awareness over
a presumed detached scientific objectivity, in the manner of nineteenth-century
Romanticism. Quite the contrary, the interpretive approach denies and
overcomes the almost de rigueur opposition of subjectivity and objectivity.
Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan, The Interpretive Turn: Emergence of An
Approach, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE-A READER 4-5 (Paul Rabinow & William
M. Sullivan eds., 1979); see RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); RORTY, supra note 98.
164.
Stanley Fish writes:
iThere is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means
a meaning that is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what
is in the speaker's or hearer's mind, a meaning that because it is prior to
interpretation can serve as a constraint on interpretation.
Stanley Fish, Introduction:Going Down the Anti-FormalistRo'd, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND
LEGAL STUDIES 4 (1989); see DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 359-63; Stanley Fish, With
the Compliments of the Author. Reflections on Austin and Derrida, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY
693, 700 (1982). Many constitutional scholars have rejected the possibility of grounding
constitutional interpretation on the intent of the framers. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Terrance
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all experience, perception, and understanding are interpretive; no matter
what we do, we are always and already interpreting.'" Hence, no
uninterpreted source of meaning ever stands outside of or prior to an
interpretive act. As Gadamer writes: "[O]ur perception is never a simple
reflection of what is presented to the senses."16
Nonetheless, interpretivists insist that this rejection of objectivity
does not force us into pure subjectivity. Interpretivists instead argue that
the reader (or interpreter) is never an independent and autonomous subject
who freely or arbitrarily imposes meaning on a text (or text-analogue). 67 To the contrary, the interpreter is always situated in a
"tradition"' 6 or, in Fish's words, in an "interpretive community,""
from which we inherit prejudices and interests that constrain and direct

our understandings of texts." 7 One's life within a community necessarSandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Schauer, supra
note 159, at 804-12; Simon, supra note 158, at 612-13, 636-45. One of the strongest
defenses of the theory that interpretation should be grounded on the author's intent is in
ED HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967).
165.
For discussions of the universality of hermeneutics, see RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, From Hermeneutics to Praxis, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES: ESSAYS IN A
PRAGMATIC MODE 94, 96 (1986); Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the
HermeneuticalProblem, in JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 128 (1980).
166.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra, note 162, at 90.
167.
A text-analogue is any meaningful thing, event, or action that can be
understood or read as if it were a text. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the
Balinese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 412, 448-49 (1973); Paul
Ricoeur, The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Consideredas a Text, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE-A READER 81 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1979).
168.
Gadamer writes: "[W]e are always situated within traditions, and this is no
objectifying process-i.e., we do not conceive of what tradition says as something other,
something alien. It is always part of us, a model or exemplar .
GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 282. Gadamer adds: "Our historical consciousness is
always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is heard. Only in the
multifariousness of such voices does it exist: this constitutes the nature of the tradition
in which we want to share and have a part." Id. at 284.
169.
Stanley Fish writes:
[Communication or understanding is possible not] because he and I share a
language, in the sense of knowing the meanings of individual words and the
rules for combining them, but because a way of thinking, a form of life,
shares us, and implicates us in a world of already-in-place objects, purposes,
goals, procedures, values, and so on; and it is to the features of that world
that any words we utter will be heard as necessarily referring.
STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class?, in Is THERE A TEXT INTHIS CLASS? 30304 (1980) [hereinafter FISH, Is There a Text]; accord Stanley Fish, Change, 86 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 423, 423-24 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Change].
170.
The concept of prejudices is from Gadamer, who writes: "iMhe historicity
of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the
initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our
openness to the world." Gadamer, supra note 165, at 133. Jurgen Habermas, in his early
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ily limits one's range of vision-what one can possibly see.or understand

Thus, James Boyd White, a legal and literary scholar,
in a text.'
states that reading is always a "communal activity."
A crucial element of interpretivism is the recognition that although
community and the concomitant prejudices constrain our possibilities for
understanding, they simultaneously enable us to communicate and to
understand. Our prejudices and interests actually open us to meaning,

understanding, and truth."7 Gadamer writes:
This formulation certainly does not mean that we are
enclosed within a wall of prejudices and only let

through the narrow portals those things that can protheory, argued that knowledge is possible only because of human "interests." Habermas,
however, delineated only three "knowledge-constitutive interests"-an interest in
prediction and control, an interest in understanding of meaning, and an interest in
emancipation.

See JOROEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy

J. Shapiro trans., 1971) [hereinafter HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE]. I am, therefore, using
the concept of human interests in a much broader manner so that it corresponds with
Gadamer's concept of prejudices. Habermas' more recent writing has focused on the
discursive redemption of three validity claims in an ideal speech situation as a means to
understanding. The three validity claims relate to propositional truth, normative rightness,
and sincerity or authenticity. See 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICA-

TIVE ACTION 137, 306-08 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); see also JORGEN HABERMAS,
What is Universal Pragmatics?,in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

1 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979).

For a discussion of transitions in Habermas's

thought, see JOHN B. THOMPSON, CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS 96-101 (1981). An excellent

and comprehensive presentation of Habermas's complex thought is in THOMAS
MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JORGEN HABERMAS (1978).

Fish captures the notion of prejudices or interests as guiding human knowledge,
though he uses neither term. He writes that "already-in-place interpretive constructs are
a condition of consciousness." Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez andthe Uses of Theory, 96
YALE L.J. 1773, 1795 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Dennis Martinez]; see Fish, Change,
supra note 169, at 424, 433.
Gadamer uses themetaphor of the "horizon" to communicate the notion that
171.
one's possibilities for understanding are limited. The horizon is "the range of vision that
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 302; see id. at 306.
172.
James Boyd White, Law as Language:Reading Law andReading Literature,
60 TEx. L. REV. 415, 415 (1982) [hereinafter White, Law as Language]; see JAMES
BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984) [hereinafter WHITE, WHEN
WORDS].

173.
Fish writes that "already-in-place interpretive constructs are a condition of
consciousness." Fish, Dennis Martinez, supra note 170, at 1795; see Fish, Change, supra
note 169, at 424, 433.
Gadamer writes: "mhe historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the
literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to
experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world." Gadamer, supra note
165, at 133.
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duce a pass saying, 'Nothing new will be said here.'
Instead we welcome just that guest who promises
something new to our curiosity. But how do we know
the guest whom we admit is one who has something
new to say to us? Is not our expectation and our
readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined
by the old that has already taken possession of us? 74
Thus, truth, knowledge, and understanding are possible-though not in
the traditional objective sense-because we participate in the tradition of
an interpretive community.
Critics charge, however, that interpretivism is no more than a
sophisticated form of subjectivism, a "disguised" idealism or cultural
relativism.'75 If, as the argument goes, the interpretivists cannot ground
meaning on some fixed and objective foundation, then meaning must be
imposed by the interpreter or, at best, by the interpretive community
itself. The meaning of a text must therefore be uncertain and changing
as the person or the community of the interpreter changes; the
interpretivists, despite their claims to the contrary, have relegated truth,
knowledge, and understanding to the emptiness of a subjective relativism.
In short, truth that is indeterminate is no truth at all.' 76
The weakness of this criticism lies in its failure to recognize that
interpretation is always a practical or concrete activity.'" Fish argues,
for example, that a text appears to have a plurality of meanings only if we
take the text out of its context, only if we imagine the text in the abstract.
But, as Fish reminds us repeatedly, we are always situated in a concrete
context: we never interpret a text in the abstract.
And situated in a
174.
Gadamer, supra note 165, at 133.
175.
Moore, supra note 11, at 957; see id. at 874, 892; HIRSCH, supra note 164,
at 41-44. Habermas has criticized Gadamer for being an idealist. See Jflrgen Habermas,
A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
335, 359-60 (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977).
176.
See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 242, 257 (1990); RICHARD
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 217 (1988); Fried, supra note 12, at 756-57; Moore,
supra note 11.
177.
Another way to view this criticism is that it warps interpretivism by forcing
it into the traditional categories of the either/or of objectivity and subjectivity. The charge
reduces to the standard claim that if we do not have objectivity, then we must have
subjectivity. One response (though an incomplete one) to this criticism is that these critics
refuse to open themselves to the possibility of overcoming the subject/object dichotomy.
178.
Fish writes:
A sentence is never apprehended independently of the context in which it is
perceived, and therefore we never know a sentence except in the stabilized
form a context has already conferred. But since a sentence can appear in
more than one context, its stabilized form will not always be the same.
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context-in an interpretive community-a text always has a determinate
meaning, though that meaning can change as the context changes. 1"
Moreover, our traditions and prejudices themselves are not abstract ideas
and words, rather they arise from and are constituted by concrete
experiences that are mediated through language."n Gadamer writes:
"Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the'
world and the all embracing form of the constitution of the world.
Yet the use of language itself is a practical activity; language is communicated through practical experiences and activities."
For instance, a child learns through a multitude of social interactions

the definition of being a police officer in our society. The child might
watch police officers performing duties on the street, or perhaps, the child

might be in a car that an officer stops for a traffic violation. Over time,
the child thus acquires the meaning of being a police officer through the
accumulation of these experiences, although the meaning is always
mediated through language. That is, these social experiences gain
meaningful shape only through linguistic concepts already existing in the
community. Thus, the child eventually learns that an officer wears a
certain type of uniform, carries a gun, drives a special car, and performs

certain tasks.

The child, in effect, carries these characteristics as

prejudices that shape the child's conception of the role of police officers
Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, LiteralLanguage, DirectSpeech Acts, the Ordinary,
the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, in
INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER 243, 256 (Paul Rabinow & William M.
Sullivan eds. 1979) [hereinafter Fish, Normal Circumstancesl;accord FISH, Is There a
Text, supra note 169, at 307-10; Gerald Graff, "Keep off the Grass,' "DropDead," and
Other Indeterminacies."A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEx. L. REV. 405, 407-08
(1982).
179.
James Boyd White also argues that interpretation is a practical activity, see
White, Law as Language, supra note 172, at 441, 444, and Gadamer similarly argues that
interpretation, understanding, and application are all part of "one unified [hermeneutic]
process." GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 308. The concreteness

of Gadamer's vision of interpretation is underscored by his heavy reliance on Heidegger,
who was an existential phenomenologist. That is, Heidegger insisted that we can
understand Being-in-the-world only by focusing on practical and everyday activities. See
Feldman, supra note 9, at 695-90; see also HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 170, at

128-29 (discussing Peirce's pragmatism); MCCARTHY, supra note 170, at 91, 184.
180.
See supra note 179.
181.
Gadamer, supra note 165, at 128; accord id. at 136-37.
182.
James Boyd White writes:
[Olur acts of language are actions in the world, not just in our minds. Even
when we think we are simply communicating information, or being rigorously
and exclusively intellectual, or just talking, we are in fact engaged in performances, in relation to others, that are ethical and political in character and
that can be judged as such.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION at ix (1990); see Patterson, supra note
9, at 973-80 (law is a practice, and all understanding occurs through language).
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in the community. The child does not acquire these prejudices in some
ideal world of abstractions; instead the child has concretely experienced
officers."'
Since we always live within an interpretive community,
interpretivism further holds that we never approach any text or textanalogue without some "fore-understanding" derived from our traditions,
prejudices, and interests.' 4 One's fore-understanding, however, does
not undermine the interpretive process by predetermining meaning: rather
interpretation consists of a dialogical "play" between the interpreter and
the text in which the meaning of the text dialectically comes into
being.185 Interpretation is, in effect, dialogue: it requires one to
question the text, to probe for its meaning, to ask new questions, to listen
to the answers, and to continue in this dialogical process as if in a
conversation." 6 One's fore-understanding "is constantly revised in
terms of what emerges as [the interpreter] penetrates into the meaning [of
the text].""8 7 Thus, the dialectical process of understanding assures that
one's answer often changes as meaning emerges even though one already
expects a certain answer as soon as interpretation begins.
Gadamer's description of the so-called hermeneutic circle captures
the dialogical nature of interpretation. In its simplest form, the hermeneutic circle underscores a relationship between a text and its constituent
parts: an interpreter can understand a whole text only by understanding
its parts, yet an interpreter can understand the parts only by anticipating
an understanding of the whole.. ss An elaborated hermeneutic circle'
however, brings within its scope the complex interactions between
interpreter, text, and tradition (or interpretive community). Interpretation
has two sides: on the one side, tradition limits the vision of the interpreter as he or she approaches the text, yet on the other side, tradition does
183.

See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

OF REALITY (1967); Feldman, Exposing, supra note 2, at 1341-43 & nn.39-42.
generally

LUDWIG

WrIrGENSTEIN,

PHILOSOPHICAL

INVESTIGATIONS

19

See

(G.E.M.

Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (language is a form of life, and hence, philosophical
questions arise when "language goes on holiday"); Robert F. Nagel, Meeting the Enemy,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 647 (1990) (elevating the conceptual over the experiential and
historical leads to "goofiness").

184.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 332; see White, Law
as Language, supra note 172, at 428 ("Mhe individual always sees from a particular
point of view and functions from a particular set of concerns.").
185.

See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 101-69.

186.
See id. at 362-79; cf. White, supra note 158, at 836, 867 (law constitutes
community through conversation).
187.

GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 267.

188.
See id. at 291; Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Problem of HistoricalConsciousness, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER 103, 146 (Paul Rabinow & William
M. Sullivan eds., 1979); Rabinow & Sullivan, supra note 163, at 6-7.
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not exist unless people constantly create and recreate it through the
The latter side emphasizes that tradition
interpretive process itself.'
as
is created as an ever new meaning of the text comes into being:
we participate in tradition by interpreting texts, we transform and
reconstitute that tradition. The two sides of interpretation are not separate
and do not function independently, rather they are simultaneous and
interrelated. They resonate together as meaning comes into being within
the hermeneutic circle.191

Gadamer's elaborated concept of the hermeneutic circle and Fish's
emphasis on "interpretive communities" underscore that we are historical
beings who live in tradition, just as we live in a community: tradition is
not a thing of the past, rather it is something we constantly participate in.
"Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it
ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of
tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves."" In other words,
we constantly constitute and reconstitute our tradition, our culture, and
our community as we engage in the dialogical understanding of texts." 9
Moreover, this constant reconstitution always is simultaneously constructive and destructive. It is constructive in the sense that we constantly
build new traditions and communities, constantly adding to our already
existing traditions and communities through interpretation and understanding, thus including new concepts, interests, prejudices, and significantly,
participants. Yet the reconstitution is also destructive insofar as we
189.
See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 281; see also
White, Law as Language, supra note 172, at 420; James Boyd White, Introduction: Is
Cultural Criticism Possible?,84 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1380-82 (1986). Habermaswrites:
Every new situation appears in a lifeworld composed of a cultural stock of

knowledge that is "always already" familiar. Communicative actors can no
more take up an extramundane position in relation to their lifeworld than they
can in relation to language as the medium for the processes of reaching
understanding through which their lifeworld maintains itself. In drawing upon
a cultural tradition, they also continue it.
2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 125 (Thomas A.
McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981).
190.
Gadamer writes: "Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist
It needs to be affirmed, embraced,
because of the inertia of what once existed.
cultivated." GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 281; cf. Fredrick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 419 (1985) (rules of language are made
and remade by society).
191.
Clifford Geertz writes: "Without men, no culture, certainly; but equally, and
more significantly, without culture, no men." CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Impact of the
Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 49
(1973).
192.
GADAMER, TRUTH AND -METHOD, supra note 162, at 293.
193.
See WHITE, WHEN WORDS, supra note 172; White, supra note 158, at 867.
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weaken or eliminate previously existing traditions and communities and
exclude concepts, interests, prejudices, and participants."
Thus, interpretivists argue that we can understand the meanings of
texts because our traditions and prejudices open us to the possibility of

knowledge, yet our traditions and prejudices constantly change as they
reconstitute through the interpretive process itself. The meaning of a text
is therefore determinate, but not static; knowledge and understanding
exist, yet they are not absolute or objective.' 95 This paradoxical quality
of interpretivism"' leads to its most serious challenge: a concern that,
in the end, interpretivism fails to achieve its initial project.

As the

historical narrative reveals, legal scholars initially took the interpretive
turn in an effort to transcend the problem of judicial review:
interpretivism promised to overcome the dichotomy between objectivity
and subjectivity while preserving the possibility of truth, knowledge, and

understanding in constitutional jurisprudence.

Antagonists charge,

however, that interpretivism lacks critical bite: interpretivists cannot tell

us how to evaluate competing interpretations of a text. If two interpreters
disagree about how they understand the same text-or even if one
interpreter understands a text in two different ways -there is no way to
determine which interpretation is correct." 9 Interpretivists, according
194.

See

MICHEL FOUCAULT,

1977); JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD,

DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH

THE POSTMODERN

(Alan Sheridan trans.

CONDITION:

A REPORT ON

KNOWLEDGE 60-67 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans. 1984). In law, Robert
Cover most clearly focused on the destructiveness or violence of the interpretive process.
Cover, supra note 114; see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988)
(whenever a community rests upon an authoritative text, different modes of interpretation
are likely to splinter that community); Richard Delgado, Storytelling For Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea For Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414-15 (1989) (storytelling
both builds and destroys community); Smith, supra note 134, at 323, 328-29 (to achieve
a "fully encompassing community" is impossible); see also THOMPSON, supra note 170,
at 66 (an antimony between participation in and alienation from tradition). Habermas
emphasizes an authoritarian element within interpretation. He writes: "The fundamental
function of world-maintaining interpretive systems is the avoidance of chaos, that is, the
overcoming of contingency. The legitimation of orders of authority and basic norms can
be understood as a specialization of this 'meaning-giving' function." JORGEN HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS 118 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press, 1975) (1973).
195.
Gadamer writes that "[elvery age has to understand a transmitted text in its
own way." GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 296.
196.
Fish writes: "Paradoxically ... words can [not] mean anything one likes, but
* .
. they always and only mean one thing, although that one thing is not always the
same." Fish, Normal Circumstances, supra note 1.78, at 249.
197.
See BORK, supra note 176, at 251-52, 256-57; POSNER, supra note 176, at
315; Moore, supra note 11, at 926; Robin L. West, Adjudication is not Interpretation:
Some Reservations About the Law-as-LiteratureMovement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 20709 (1987). Philosophers and social theorists have attacked Gadamer's interpretivism on
this same ground. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 105-09; Jirgen Habermas,
The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality (1971), in JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY
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to this argument, can respond only by acknowledging that the meaning of
the text changes with its context and with the prejudices and interests of
the individual interpreter.
Thus, despite the protestations of
interpretivists, the critics conclude that interpretivism ultimately is a form
of subjective relativism and thus renders meaning indeterminate.," If
this charge is true, interpretivism may indeed be, as one of its antagonists
has asserted, "a turn for the worse." "
III. REPUBLICAN INTERPRETIVISM

A. Synthesis
The republican revival and the interpretive turn currently stand as
two of the leading movements in constitutional jurisprudence, but each
faces a critical challenge that threatens its vitality. Critics of republicanism charge that its pursuit of the common good encourages closure of the
political community and the oppression of divergent voices. This
criticism becomes especially severe when the common good is cast as a
foundation for objective. political and constitutional decision making.
Meanwhile, critics of interpretivism charge that it fails to provide the
standards necessary to evaluate competing interpretations of the constitutional text. The thesis of this section is that republicanism and
interpretivism can be synthesized into a single theory-republican
interpretivism-which can withstand the critical challenges that threaten
to unravel each theory as it stands alone." The interpretive elements
HERMENEuTiCS 181-211 (1980). Other commentators have questioned the success of
Habermas' attempt to ground critical theory, which Habermas developed in part as a
response to the perceived weakness in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 170, at 106-25.
198.
The threat of this charge has apparently influenced several would-be
interpretivists to reject interpretivism, though these rejections have taken various forms.
Some theorists have accepted the criticism while still accepting some basic interpretivist
insights, and thus these theorists have become some type of deconstructionist. They
accept the either/or-either we can ground knowledge on an objective foundation, or we
have only relativistic subjectivity-but then conclude that objectivity is indeed impossible
since, as interpretivists argue, meaning depends on our prejudices. Consequently,
according to these theorists, the interpreter imposes meaning on a text through the
exercise of will and raw political power. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature,
60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982). Other would-be interpretivists have rejected interpretivism
(though not always explicitly) for fear of relativism and thus again quest after objective
foundations. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 131.
199.
Moore, supra note 11.
200.
i use the term republican interpretivism, as opposed to interpretive
republicanism, because interpretivism is more fundamental than republicanism. That is,
regardless of what political theory one may prefer, recommend, or advocate for, the basic
insights of interpretivism remain true. See Feldman, supra note 9.
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of this synthesis respond to the charge that the republican pursuit of the
common good threatens oppression and closure, while the republican elements of the synthesis respond to the charge that interpretivism lacks
critical bite.
Important threads of commonality that run between republicanism
and interpretivism initially suggest the prospect of weaving the two
theories together into a single, stronger fabric. In particular, republicanism and interpretivism both emphasize the concepts of community and
dialogue. Republicanism insists that citizens exist within a political
community where the central activity is a dialogue that seeks the common
good. Politics, therefore, is a communal and deliberative process, not an
unprincipled battle for raw power."' Interpretivism, meanwhile, holds
that the community and its traditions instill in us prejudices and interests
that open us to the very possibility of truth and understanding. The
meaning of a text emerges, in effect, through a dialogue between the
interpreter, the community, and the text. The interpreter, starting with
a fore-understanding derived from his or her prejudices (and hence from
the community), must question the text, listen for its answer, ask new
questions, and continue to probe the text in this dialogical manner until
its meaning comes into being.'
Republicanism and interpretivism thus connect through their shared
emphases on community and dialogue. This ready connection then
facilitates the further integration of the two theories into a republican
interpretivism. The core of this new theory of American constitutional
jurisprudence and political action is the concept of the common good.
The common good of republicanism can be added to interpretivism to
provide a critical standard for interpreting the Constitution. Thus,
competing interpretations of the Constitution are evaluated by asking
which interpretation best promotes the common good. Interpretivism, on
the other hand, can enrich republicanism by revealing that the common
good is an interpretive concept. That is, the common good is not an
objective foundation on which to ground constitutional adjudication, rather
it is a concept that remains always open to interpretation-open to the
dialogical questioning of the interpretive process.
The common good of republican interpretivism provides critical bite
for constitutional interpretation, not by furnishing an objective foundation
for decision, but by supplying a focal point for critical constitutional
discussion. The common good focuses the interpretive dialogue by directing and generating our questioning of the constitutional text as its answers
and its meaning emerge. When we interpret the Constitution, we
typically concentrate on one provision or clause-whether it be the Equal
201.
202.

See supra text accompanying notes 18-136.
See supra text accompanying notes 137-99.
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Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Establishment Clause, or
any other provision or clause-but we should not forget that the Constitution is a whole document, despite its many parts. If, as Gadamer argues,
a text must be understood as an answer to a question,' then the
Constitution answers the question, "What is the common good?" Each
constitutional provision should be read as reflecting, in the words of
Publius, the "whole tenor"' of the Constitution: each provision
somehow contributes to the overarching goal of the common good. To
evaluate competing interpretations of the same clause, we must ask which
interpretation best advances the common good. In short, the common
good of republican interpretivism is the interest (or prejudice) that makes
constitutional knowledge possible? 5
Although the common good provides the critical bite that
interpretivism may otherwise be lacking, the common good of republican
interpretivism, unlike that of traditional republicanism, is not vulnerable
to objectivist readings.
Rather, the common good of republican
interpretivism is interpretive through and through. Because it is a form
of interpretivism, republican interpretivism rejects the subject/object
dichotomy: the common good neither provides an objective foundation
for constitutional adjudication nor is it an empty concept, waiting for free
and atomistic interpreters to impose their personal meanings. Instead, as
an interpretive concept, the common good bears a determinate meaning
in each concrete context, yet its meaning changes as the community and
traditions change. The meaning of the common good, like all meaning,
emerges through the interpretive dialogue of text, interpreter, and
community. At the same time, the common good itself stands as an
interest or prejudice derived from the tradition of the American constitutional community. Hence, the common good, like all interests and
prejudices, constrains yet enables interpretation-in particular, constitutional interpretation. Moreover, as part of tradition, the common good
is not static, rather it is constantly constituted and reconstituted through
the dialogue of the interpretive process.20
203.
See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 374.
204.
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); accord THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (interpret according to the "manifest tenor" of the whole document).
205.
Cf.Patterson, supra note 9, at 953 (the meaning of a legal rule is a function
of its point or purpose).
206.
It is important to underscore that my argument is that interpretivism reveals
that the common good is an interpretive concept, not that interpretivism changes the
common good into an interpretive concept. True interpretivism holds that all concepts are
interpretive; we are always and already interpreting whenever we turn to a text or textanalogue. Thus, one cannot choose to make the common good into an objective or
subjective concept instead of an interpretive concept. One can never be free of the constraints of the interpretive community and its traditions. Thus, as Stanley Fish has
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Interpretivism supports and enriches republicanism in additional

ways, beyond revealing that the common good is an interpretive concept.
Republicanism rejects the atomistic individual that underlies pluralistic
theory and asserts instead that the citizen must be conceived within the
political community. Interpretivism explains why the free and isolated

individual of pluralism is a myth: each person is always situated within
a community and its traditions, which simultaneously enable yet constrain
one's ability to understand the meaning of a text or any other meaningful
event (text-analogue).207 Yet, interpretivism also insists that the community or the state does not stand prior to the individual citizen as in

Aristotelian republicanism. Instead, the community and its traditions
must constantly be constituted and reconstituted through concrete and
individual acts of interpretation. Moreover, interpretivism undermines
pluralism, the chief rival of republicanism. Pluralism developed because
of a prior commitment to ethical relativism, yet interpretivists persuasively argue that truth and knowledge are possible. If interpretivism therefore
defeats relativism, then pluralism loses its theoretical support and
republicanism becomes even more appealing.2 8
Republican interpretivism is inherently a critical, not a conservative,
Casting the republican common good as an
constitutional theory.
interpretive concept explains how constitutional knowledge and hence
argued, Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 161, Owen Fiss misconstrues interpretivism when
he asserts that ajudge can ignore or mistakenly apply what Fiss calls the disciplining rules
of the legal (interpretive) community. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. I do
argue, however, that whether or not one is aware that all concepts, including the common
good, are interpretive may affect one's political and interpretive commitments and actions.
But cf. Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 161, at 1347 (one's account of adjudication and
interpretation does not affect one's practices). In short, we all interpret, but we are not
all interpretivists. To be a true interpretivist, one must self-consciously recognize that we
are always and already interpreting, that we constantly seaich for and create meaning.
See Feldman, Exposing, supra note 2, at 1349-56.
207.
Cf. SANDEL, supra note 114, at 179 (the individual isolated from the
community is without character). See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTuE:
A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984) (1981) (the loss of community in modem
society undermines our search for values).
208.
At the same time, republicanism reinforces interpretivism by helping to refute
further the charge of idealism or subjectivism. See supra text accompanying notes 17583. Republicanism suggests that dialogue is necessarily a political activity, a process that
occurs in a political community. Thus, the dialogue of interpretation-where text,
interpreter, and community all meet-is inherently political: the search for and the
constitution of meaning is also a search for and a constitution of (political) values. See
THE POLrrIcs OF INTERPRETATION (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983) (essays discussing the
question of whether interpretation is political). Without politics, community does not
exist, and without community, understanding and interpretation do not occur. As
republican theorists, going back to Aristotle, have emphasized, political dialogue is a
practical or concrete activity, and hence the dialogue of interpretation is likewise practical
and concrete, not idealistic.
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criticism are possible: our tradition of the common good enables us to
understand the truth of the Constitution. That is, the common good opens
us to constitutional meaning and consequently opens us also to the
constructive reconstitution of our tradition of the common good. And as
we reconstitute the meaning of the common good through interpretation,

we can open its meaning and hence our community to new interests and
participants.'

Nonetheless, to acknowledge the common good as interpretive
underscores how it, like all aspects of tradition, constrains constitutional
interpretation. Our already existing interests and prejudices, derived in
part from our constitutional tradition of the common good, necessarily
exclude potential constitutional meanings and render some voices silent
or unheard. Moreover, as the common good is reconstituted through
interpretation to include certain interests, prejudices, and participants

within the communal dialogue, we necessarily and simultaneously exclude
or deny other interests, prejudices, and participants. In these senses,
then, constitutional interpretation that focuses on the common good is
violent and destructive-though all interpretation inherently suffers from

this same fate. 10
Yet, by recognizing the potential violence and destructiveness of the
interpretive common good, we can reinforce the critical elements of
republican interpretivism. Interpretivism reveals that understanding is
always, in part, a struggle. We must struggle to stretch our vision to the
limits imposed by our interests and prejudices so that we can see
potentially novel meanings in old and new texts. And we must struggle
to reconstitute tradition and community, to include and to exclude
previously accepted and rejected interests and participants.

Thus,

209.
Thus, although republican interpretivism is opposed to pluralism as a political
theory, it is not opposed to cultural pluralism. Rather, republican interpretivism is
consistent with and supports a cultural pluralism that recognizes and celebrates the many
subcultures that constitute American society. Cf.GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra
note 162, at 305 ("To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is
close at hand-not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole
and in truer proportion."); Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the
Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 487 (1984) ("Through discourse, the antagonists may thus
discover or uncover or rediscover their common humanity, ties that truly bind them
together notwithstanding their divisive conflicts.").
210.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text; cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 11 (1988) ("the narrative task itself generally

involves participation in conflict," and there is a "necessary place of conflict within
traditions"). Although all interpretation is in part inherently violent, an official legal
interpretation certainly may have more direct and violent social consequences than, say,
a scholar's interpretation of a literary text. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word,
95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
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republican interpretivism necessarily envisions politics as struggle or
conflict."' Whereas other forms of republicanism threaten to suffocate
diverse voices under the cover of forced consensus and stifling conformity, republican interpretivism acknowledges that even a politics of the
common good involves conflict.
Unlike, however, the political conflict of pluralism, which leads only
to the satisfaction of the selfish interests of the victors (while the losers
lament their misfortune), the political conflict of republican interpretivism
potentially leads us to open ourselves to new meanings of the common
good and to open our communities to different voices. Although all
interpretation is, in part, violent and destructive, not all interpretation is
equally so. That is, all interpretation rests on tradition and community,
and all traditions and communities inherently include some interests and
participants while excluding others, but some traditions and communities
are more open and inclusive than others. Republican interpretivism can
help to transform our political community so that it strives to be as open
and inclusive as possible.
Republican interpretivism can serve this transformative role because
it emphasizes that the meaning of the common good remains always in
question, open to the communal dialogue. By self-consciously recognizing the common good as an interpretive concept, we generate dialogue
within the political community. While the interpretive common good
always has a determinate meaning in each concrete situation, there is no
mechanical process or method to reveal that meaning. 12 Instead, its
meaning must come into being through the interpretive dialogue between
constitutional text, interpreter, and community. The political dialogue,
according to republican interpretivism, should never end. The political
community should strain towards openness as it struggles to find the truth
211.
Cf BARBER, supra note 37, at 128 (conflict is central to all politics).
Rousseau wrote: "If there were no different interests, the common interest, which would
never encounter any obstacle, would scarcely be felt. Everything would proceed on its
own and politics would cease being an art." J. J. ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
at bk. II, ch. 3, reprintedin BASIC POLITICAL WRrrINos 139, 156 n.2 (Donald A. Cress
trans. and ed., 1987). Focusing on the fight against racial discrimination, Kimberld
Crenshaw writes: "The struggle, it seems, is to maintain a contextualized, specified world
view that reflects the experience of Blacks." Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1349 (1988).
212.

Gadamer intended the title of his major work, TRUTH AND METHOD, to be

ironic. He argued for the possibility of truth, but through the interpretive process and not
through method. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at xxi, 295, 309.
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of the common good in the Constitution.2"3 Every claim to fix the
definition of the common good is suspect. Even our fundamental
commitment to the common good of republicanism must always remain
open to question; the interpretation of the Constitution is never finished.
Political dialogue over the meaning of the interpretive common good
opens us to recognize the bonds of tradition within the community, the
common interests that we already share. But we also recognize the true
conflicts that exist-we hear the disparate voices and their diverse
interests-and hence we recognize the difficult moral and constitutional
"'
issues that we, as a community, must decide.21
Republican
interpretivism tells us, however, that the path to decision is always
dialogue: to decide even the most difficult issues, we need to openly
discuss the common good. Certainly, decisions must be made and actions
must be taken-and many individuals and groups often suffer because of
these decisions and actions, which may be coercive and violent15-yet
republican interpretivism proclaims that the dialogue should never close,
213.
My notion of the open political community that republican interpretivism
struggles towards loosely resembles Habermas's vision of politics in his "ideal speech
situation." Habermas writes:
Discourse can be understood as that form of communication that is removed
from contexts of experience and action and whose structure assures us: that
the bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings are
the exclusive object of discussion; that participants, themes and contributions
are not restricted except with reference to the goal of testing the validity
claims in questions; that no force except that of the better argument is
exercised; and that, as a result, all motives except that of the cooperative
search for truth are excluded. If under these conditions a consensus about the
recommendation to accept a norm arises argumentatively, that is, on the basis
of hypothetically proposed alternative justifications, then this consensus
expresses a "rational will." Since all those affected have, in principle, at least
the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the "rationality" of the
discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioral
expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest
ascertained without deception. The interest is common because the constraintfree consensus permits only what all can want; it is free of deception because
even the interpretations of needs in which each individual must be able to
recognize what he wants become the object of discursive will-formation. The
discursively formed will may be called "rational" because the formal
properties of discourse and of the- deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee
that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable interests, by which I mean needs that can be communicatively shared.
HABERMAS, supra note 194, at 107-08 (emphasis in original). I disagree, however, with
Habermas's argument that communication can ever be removed from contexts of
experience, even in an ideal or theoretical sense.
214.
Cf. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 90-109 (1982) (an ethic of
caring is based on creating and maintaining relationships, and thus many ethical questions
create difficult problems because possible resolutions may harm others).
215.
See Cover, supra note 210.
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the decision should never be final, so long as anyone wishes to question
the meaning of the common good. Oppression, from this viewpoint, is
to silence other voices, to ignore divergent interests, and in its extreme,
to crush the imagination necessary for others even to have a different
voice."16 But so long as individuals and groups are not oppressed, the
political dialogue can generate new communal bonds and shared interests,

as the community and its traditions are reconstituted through the interpretive process.""
216.
C. Crenshaw, supra note 211, at 1358-59 ("It matters little whether [a]
coerced group rejects the dominant ideology and can offer a competing conception of the
world; if they have been labeled 'other' by the dominant ideology, they are not heard.");
Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROORESSIVE CRrrQUE 413, 422-24 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (the most effective
domination is the one that prevents people from even imagining that their fives could be
better).
Furthermore, the devastating material consequences that flow from political
oppression should never be overlooked or diminished in importance, but even those
consequences are meaningful only as they are interpreted through the medium of
language. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (on the universality of hermeneutics). A difficulty for republican interpretivism is that a material consequence such as
poverty is likely to disable an individual (or group) from fully participating in any public
dialogue over the common good. One enmeshed in the despair of poverty is more likely
to be concerned about life's essentials-food, shelter and clothing-than about any
common good. Nonetheless, pluralism is even less likely than republican interpretivism
to solve this problem. In the pluralist world, impoverished individuals are unlikely to
have the resources needed to battle effectively in the political arena in order to maximize
the satisfaction of their self-interest. Moreover, significant social change is more likely
to occur if all were to seek the common good as opposed to their own self-interest. See
Feldman, Whose Common Good?, supra note 2.
217.
Gadamer writes that, in a true conversation or dialogue, "one does not try to
argue the other person down." GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 162, at 367.
He adds: "To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting
oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed
into a communion in which we do not remain what we were." Id. at 379.
Republican interpretivism is, of course, not the only political or constitutional theory
that argues for opening the political dialogue and community. For related viewpoints, see
Burt, supra note 209 (Supreme Court adjudication allows us to generate communal bonds
despite sharp disagreements); Delgado, supra note 194 (the advantage of storytelling is
that it allows oppositionist voices or perspectives to be heard); Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (adjudication should include the
understanding of others); Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 111, at 1527-37
(republicanism suggests that we should try to keep our communal dialogue open); Martha
Minow, Foreword.-Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (Supreme Court
justices should try to place themselves in the positions of others); Robin West, Relativism,
Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1482-83 (1990) (urging the inclusion of
previously excluded voices and interests). For a discussion of several interesting means
of increasing the likelihood of open political dialogue, see BARBER, supranote 37, at 261311.
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Although republican interpretivism is, in a sense, a theory of judicial
review, it does not speak solely to the courts. As already discussed, each
provision of the Constitution must be read as part of the whole document,
as somehow contributing to the overall purpose of the common good.218
Even the structural provisions of the Constitution, delineating the roles
and powers of the three governmental branches, should be read as
pursuing the common good. Thus, for example, when Congress acts
219
pursuant to its powers under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
it theoretically should seek to achieve the common good. And when
citizens vote for their representatives, the citizens theoretically should be
concerned about the common good.'
Moreover, since interpretation
is universal-we are always and already interpreting whenever we turn to
a text or other meaningful event (text-analogue)22 -all citizens and
institutions within society are potential participants in the interpretive
dialogue over the common good. The Supreme Court does not bestow on
the constitutional common good a definitive meaning, which then serves
as an object that others can merely grasp. Instead, Congress, the
President, other public officials, citizens, and any other persons, groups,
and institutions that are concerned with public issues all participate in the
political dialogue over the common good, provided that their voices are
heard and respected by the other participants. m
Thus, republican interpretivism envisions a political process where
citizens vote to elect governmental officials who are most likely to pursue
successfully the common good, not most likely to maximize the satisfaction of the citizens' personal interests. Legislators then enact laws to
achieve the common good, not to maximize the likelihood of their
reelection, and the executive similarly administers the laws in pursuit of
the common good. Finally, in judicial review, the courts must determine
whether legislation and other governmental actions correspond with the
common good as embodied in the Constitution. It must be remembered,
however, that the common good never has an objective meaning: the
common good is always an interpretive concept whose meaning emerges
only through the dialogue of question and answer. The meaning of the
See supra text accompanying note 204.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
220.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
221.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
222.
Thus, the interpretive component of republican interpretivism reveals the
error of those new republicans who seek to limit the dialogue over the common good to
some segment of the political community such as Congress or the courts. See supra text
accompanying notes 119-22. Habermas argues that politics needs to include a debate over
those (public) values that make life meaningful. See HABERMAS, supra note 194; Anthony
218.
219.

Giddens, Jargen Habermas, in THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 121, 134 (Quentin Skinner ed., 1985).
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common good remains always open to dialogue; it is not a question that
others can defer to the Supreme Court.'
Although citizens and governmental officials do sometimes pursue the
common good,' republican interpretivism does not naively believe that
they always do so. Many often fail to achieve or even to seek the
common good.'
Nonetheless, republican interpretivism presents the
common good as a critical standard, a norm that allows us to evaluate
political actions and constitutional decisions. Quite simply, regardless of
223.
Cass Sunstein has summarized several recent events in which the Court was
merely one participant in a dialogue over public issues. Sunstein writes:
Consider . . . a striking set of recent events: the passage of the most
important law in history protecting handicapped people, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, enacted in the face of Supreme Court decisions refusing to
use the Constitution in this area; the extraordinary citizen response to Supreme
Court decisions restricting the abortion right, a response that has dramatically
energized the women's movement; the new Clean Air Act, in the face of
Supreme Court decisions taking a relatively passive role in protecting the
environment; and the likely passage, soon, of a new civil rights bill broader
than anything that the Supreme Court might have required. Whatever the
merits of any one of these developments, they attest to the enormous potential
of moral and political and sometimes even constitutional discussion outside the
courtroom.
Cass Sunstein, The Spirit of the Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, March 11, 1991, at 36; cf.
ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1989) (meaning of the Constitution is not just from judicial

opinions, but also from "the institutions, behaviors, and understandings that form the
general political culture"); LEVINSON, supra note 194, at 47-50 (each institution and
individual must decide constitutional issues); Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1986) (citizens and governmental institutions other than the
Supreme Court should decide constitutional questions); Stephen M. Griffin, What is
Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 515-18 (1989) (Supreme Court is but one arena of political
struggle); Robin West, Progressiveand ConservativeConstitutionalism,88 MICH. L. REV.
641, 650-51, 713-21 (1990) (progressives should aim their constitutional arguments at
Congress and other citizens, not at the courts). Thus, republican interpretivism contravenes the charge that republicanism requires legislators largely to be insulated so that they
can pursue the common good without feeling political pressure. See. e.g., Farber &
Frickey, supra note 1, at 876-78; Fitts, supra note 124. See generally NANCY L.
SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GUITAR: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY (1988)

(representatives do not simply act on behalf of constituents or act directly on constituent
directions, rather the representative interacts with constituents, who also interact amongst
themselves, in the formation of political community).
224.
See supra note 107. For example, according to public choice theory, see
supra note 1, a rational person acting in his or her self-interest should never vote, yet
many individuals nonetheless do. See Mansbridge, supra note 35, at 14-15.
225.
See supra note 1 (on public choice theory). Alasdair Maclntyre argues that
"[mlodern politics is civil war carried on by other means." MACINTYRE, supra note 207,
at 253. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (on American culture of individualism).
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their occasional or frequent failings, political and constitutional decision
makers should strive to follow the common good.'
The historical
narrative of the republican revival suggests, moreover, that the framers
envisioned just such a constitutional government: one that would act for
the common good despite the human propensities for greed and selfishness. The framers, in other words, were keenly aware of the Machiavellian tension between the virtues of the common good and the vices of
factionalism. 2 7
Consequently, if a congressional majority enacts legislation that does
not reflect the common good, then citizens should question the action and
the congressional opposition should seek to reverse the decision. If the
constitutionality of the law is challenged in the judiciary, then the courts
should hold it unconstitutional. But the common good is never a fixed
and certain object, rather it is an interpretive concept that is constantly
open to question. Further dialogue, whether in one's home, the halls of
Congress, or a courtroom, may lead the participants in a dispute to
understand a new meaning for the common good in that situation.'
Interpretivism reveals that the meaning of the common good becomes
determinate only in a concrete context: although the common good is a
critical standard, it is not a foundation for objective political and
constitutional decision making. Thus, a dispute over legislation and its
constitutionality generates political dialogue, and, through that dialogue,
we reconstitute our traditions, our community, and the meaning of the
common good.

226.
Many actions, however, are likely to result from an uncertain mix of selfinterest and a pursuit of the common good. See Mansbridge, supra note 35, at 20-22.
227.
See supra text accompanying notes 92-97. This tension between the pursuit
of the common good and the pursuit of one's personal interests is evident in the framing
of the Constitution itself. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) (the Constitution reflects the
property interests of the framers); ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrrIUTION

(Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987) (essays reacting to Beard's thesis). Thus, I do not
mean to engage in the Constitution worship that suggests the motives of the framers were
always pure; their failure to prohibit slavery provides tangible evidence to the contrary.
Nevertheless, I read the Constitution as a whole as pursuing the common good and as
creating a government to pursue the common good, even if the framers themselves did not
always live up to this standard.
228.
Recent empirical studies suggest that dialogue can increase group identity,
which in turn increases cooperative behavior. See Mansbridge, supra note 35, at 17; see,
e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My
Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
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B. Application: Flag Desecration

The recent dispute over flag desecration illustrates the applicability
of republican interpretivism. Several themes of republican interpretivism
emerged during the dispute and influenced its outcome. In particular, the
concepts of dialogue, community, and the common good all played a part
in the unfolding drama-though the importance of their respective roles
varied. Nevertheless, a full recognition and acceptance of republican
interpretivism would have transformed the discussion and its resolution.
By more self-consciously focusing on the common good, the community
would have generated a political dialogue that might have more effectively
opened us to diverse voices and interests.
One of the most striking aspects of the dispute over flag desecration
was its development as a public dialogue. At the outset of the dialogue,
forty-eight states and the federal government had enacted laws to prohibit
the desecration of the flag.'
At the Republican National Convention
in Dallas during 1984, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag to
protest policies of both the Reagan administration and certain Dallas-based
corporations. Johnson was convicted for violating the Texas law prohibitOn June 21, 1989, in
ing the desecration of a venerated object.'
Texas v. Johnson," the Supreme Court held that Johnson's symbolic
conduct was protected under the free speech clause of the First
Amendment 2 and that his conviction was therefore unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment thus
effectively rendered invalid all of the flag desecration statutes.
Johnson generated a heated public dialogue over the meaning of free
speech and the symbolic importance of the American flag. The dialogue,
which took place in Congress,' 3 law reviews,' and popular me229.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424-28 & n. 1 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
230.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400.
231.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
232.
233.
See, e.g., Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-754
(1989) [hereinafter Measures to Protect]; Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the
Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson. HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
1572 (1989) [hereinafter Statutory and ConstitutionalResponses].
See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Flag-Burning Case: Freedom of Speech
234.
When We Need It Most, 68 N.C. L. REV. 165 (1989); Frank Michelman, Saving Old
Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IowA L. REV. 111 (1989).
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dia, 35 centered on whether Congress should respond to Johnson either
by enacting a new federal statute that might pass constitutional muster or
by proposing a constitutional amendment to allow the prohibition of flag
desecration. 2 6 Diverse viewpoints emerged from this communal
dialogue. Some argued that amending the Constitution was the only sure
method to guarantee protection of the flag, and such protection was
demanded because the flag symbolized national unity."3 7 Others argued
for a constitutional amendment, but only as the lesser of two evils. They
believed that Congress would inevitably take one of the two suggested
actions, either proposing an amendment or enacting a statute. If Congress
passed a statute, the argument continued, then the Court might significantly alter First Amendment jurisprudence in order to find the new law
constitutional. This feared shift in the Supreme Court's approach was
considered to threaten free speech more seriously than a constitutional
amendment, which would create a narrow exception to the First Amendment, limited only to flag desecration."'
Others argued that a statute, not a constitutional amendment, would
be the lesser of two evils. They believed that Congress could carefully
draft a narrow and precise law that would pass constitutional muster
without the Court changing its free speech jurisprudence. This route was
considered less threatening to free speech than an amendment that would
directly change the Bill of Rights. 9 Others argued vehemently that the
nation should resist the urge either to amend the Constitution or to enact
a new flag desecration statute,' while still others added that the entire
dispute 1 was wasteful and symptomatic of increasing political demagogy.2
In October of 1989, Congress finally enacted the Flag Protection
Act 2 and thus temporarily halted the call for a constitutional amend235.
See, e.g., Robin Toner, Senate Rejects Amendment Outlawing Flag Desecration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1989, at A1; William M. Kunstler, What Shocked Me Most
About the Flag Decision, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1989, §1, at 25; Hendrik Hertzberg, 7RB
From Washington. Flagellation, NEw REPUBLIC, July 17 & 24, 1989, at 4; What Price
Old Glory?, TIME, July 10, 1989, at 23; Justices, 5-4, Back Protestor's Right To Burn
The Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, § 1, at 1.
236.
U.S. CONST. art. V (on constitutional amendment).
237.
See, e.g., Measures to Protect, supra note 233, at 2-4 (statement of Senator
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina); Statutory and Constitutional Responses, supra note
233, at 199-203 (statement of Robert Bork, American Enterprise Institute).
238.
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 234.
239.
See, e.g., Statutory and Constitutional Responses, supra note 233, at 99-106
(statement of Laurence Tribe); Stone, ,supranote 234.
240.
See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 234.
241.
See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, TRB From Washington: Stars and Snipes, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 9 & 16, 1990, at 4; Get Serious, New Republic, July 9 & 16, 1990, at
7-8 [hereinafter Get Seriousl; see also Stone, supra note 234, at 124.
242.
Flag Protection Act of 1989, 242 Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
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ment. When the constitutionality of the Act was immediately challenged
in United States v. Eichman, 3 the dialogue shifted again to the Supreme Court. Eichman, like Johnson, involved the burning of a flag as
part of a political protest,' and on June 11, 1990, the Court held that
the Act, like the Texas statute in Johnson, was constitutionally invalid.
Once more, many reacted by demanding a constitutional amendment, and
the public dialogue continued, with the focus returning again to Congress.' " Within less than a month, however, Congress rejected a
proposed constitutional amendment.'
The wide participation in the public debate over flag desecration and
the varied responses of different institutions and individuals reflect the
important dialogical quality of republican interpretivism. Moreover, the
various Supreme Court opinions in Johnson and Eichman often recognize
the importance of dialogue as a means to political action. For example,
in Johnson, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority that "our toleration of
criticism . . . is a sign and source of our strength.27

Brennan added

that the means for convincing others of the importance of the flag was
through persuasion, not punishment."
In Eichman, Justice
Stevens-even in dissent-recognized a societal interest in hearing voices
that are often ignored. 9 Furthermore, Stevens implicitly recognized
that the Court was, in effect, an important participant in a communal
dialogue over the value of the flag and flag burning. Stevens wrote that
the "Court's decision to place its stamp of approval on the act of flag
burning"' transformed the meaning of flag burning itself. In other
words, Stevens acknowledged that when the Court interprets the
Constitution, it reconstitutes tradition and the community."'
243.

110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).

244.
245.

Id. at 2406.
See Kinsley, supra note 241; Get Serious, supra note 241.

246.

H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNo. REC. H4087-88 (daily

ed. June 21, 1990); S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S8736-37
(daily ed. June 26, 1990). The dialogue continued even after this apparently final
congressional action. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 134, at 439-41; West, supra note
136, at 93-98; Flag-Burning Ban Gaining State Support, TULSA TRIBUNE, Dec. 12, 1990,

§ 1, at 6 (Disabled American Veterans group trying to create a grass roots campaign
leading to resolutions at the city and county level that would ask Congress and the state
legislature for a constitutional amendment).
247.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419.
248.
Id.
249.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250.
Id.
251.
Moreover, in Eichman, Stevens was sufficiently influenced by the dialogue
to acknowledge the reasonableness of opposed positions. He wrote that "some thoughtful
persons believe that [protecting flag desecration] will actually enhance" the symbolic
meaning of the flag. Id. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The flag desecration dispute also raised the concept of community,
another important theme of republican interpretivism. The debate revealed
a community that was, in effect, struggling with and questioning its own
values and traditions, especially its constitutional tradition of free speech.
Once again, the statements of the Supreme Court Justices are illustrative.
In Johnson, Justice Brennan wrote that, contrary to the claims of the
dissenters, the constitutional protection of flag desecrators would strengthen the place of the flag "in our community. '""2 The Court's holding,
according to Brennan, would reaffirm "the principles of freedom and
inclusiveness that the flag best reflects. '""
Meanwhile, in dissent,
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the meanings of the flag and flag
burning arose, not from governmental fiat, but from the history or
tradition of the American community.'
Finally, the theme of the common good emerged in several different
ways during the public dialogue over flag desecration. For example, the
mere fact that a majority of senators and representatives twice rejected a
constitutional amendment suggests that our legislators sometimes consider
the common good, not just their own interests in being reelected.
Whereas little or no political advantage was likely to be gained from
opposing an amendment, favoring an amendment was likely to yield
ample political profits.-5 . Moreover, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Johnson and Eichman suggest that the Justices also at least considered the
common good: the somewhat liberal free speech holdings were, to no
small degree, surprising in light of the largely conservative makeup of the
current Court. Plus, many of the arguments that were made throughout
the public dialogue touched on the common good. Diverse arguments
ranging from one extreme-the flag must be protected as a symbol of
national unity'-to the other extreme-"the flag burner charges the
nation with betraying its ideals""-can all be interpreted as attempts
to define the common good in the context of the flag dispute.
Although the concepts of dialogue, community, and the common
good all played a role in the dispute over flag desecration, the dispute
252.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419.
253.
Id. (emphasis added).
254.
Id. at 434 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); accord id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
255.
Some politicians may have believed that they could score political points by
protecting the integrity of the Constitution, but the public dialogue suggested that far more
believed that the greatest political advantage would come from favoring a constitutional
amendment. See Kinsley, supra note 241.
256.
See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (Texas argued that this interest justified
its flag desecration statute).
257.
Michelman, supra note 234, at 1362; see also Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2410
(punishing the flag burner "dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered,
and worth revering").
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might have been transformed if the themes of republican interpretivism
had been featured more prominently. A full acceptance of republican
interpretivism would have underscored that the public dialogue should
have focused on the common good. The overriding questions should have
been how does the free speech clause of the First Amendment manifest
our understanding of the common good, and how does flag desecration-its punishment or protection-relate to free speech. In this manner,
republican interpretivism would have provided a common ground for
debate or, in other words, a focal point for dialogue. With the dialogue
more focused, we might have been more likely to recognize our shared
or similar concerns and interests as well as our points of disagreement.
Perhaps most important, instead of being tempted to condemn the entire
dialogue as symptomatic of political demagogy, 25' we might have recognized the value of the dialogue in itself-as an opportunity for the political
community to question its traditions and to reconstitute the meaning of the
common good as it is embedded in the First Amendment. And as we
reconstitute the meaning of the common good, we reconstitute tradition
and our community, which in turn open us to the understanding of future
texts and events. While flag burning may be "ultimately a matter of
secondary importance," 9 its power to generate dialogue about the
meaning of free speech was profoundly important.
If the Supreme Court had emphasized these themes, several important
aspects of the Court's opinions may have been altered. For example,
whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the important role that
tradition or history plays in generating meaning within the community,' he failed to realize that to understand the Constitution or any other
text or text-analogue, we must question tradition, not merely accept it.
Interpretation is a dialogue between text, interpreter, and community that
requires us constantly to reconstitute our community and its traditions.
Likewise, Justice Stevens recognized a societal interest in hearing voices
that are often ignored," 1 but he characterized that interest as of only
secondary importance. The societal interest merely "buttressed"' a
predominant concern for an individual's right to choose how to express
oneself. Republican interpretivism suggests, however, that the interests
of the individual and the community are not so easily separated and
prioritized. The community cannot survive without the participation of
individuals in the political dialogue, yet individuals participate and
communicate only because of the prejudices and interests that they derive
from their community and its traditions. Thus, the communal interest in
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See supra text accompanying note 241.
Stone, supra note 234, at 124.
See supra text accompanying note 254.
See supra text accompanying note 249.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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hearing diverse voices is paramount: those diverse voices open the
community as it reconstitutes its traditions, which enable individuals to
communicate in the first place.
The most significant potential influence of republican interpretivism
may be in how it can change our attitude towards the flag burners themselves. Consistent with popular sentiment, even those Justices who
favored constitutional protection for flag desecration distanced themselves
from the expressive conduct by denigrating the defendants and their
political speech. In Johnson, for instance, the majority wrote: "[W]e
submit that nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an unknown man
will change our Nation's attitude towards its flag."'
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy questioned whether the defendant was able to
understand the significance of his own actions.'
And in Eichman, the
majority '' analogized flag burning to "virulent ethnic and religious
epithets. 20
Republican interpretivism, however-because of its emphasis on a
communal dialogue over the common good-suggests that the expressive
conduct of the flag burners should have been celebrated, not excoriated.
Their mere participation in a political discussion or protest should have
been encouraged, for dialogue is crucial to the life of the political
community, and their underlying political messages should have been
heard and discussed. Furthermore, these participants in the communal
dialogue attracted an unusual amount of attention and therefore generated
significant and beneficial dialogue because they chose to express
themselves through the controversial means of flag burning. They, in
effect, attempted to force the community to open itself, to hear voices that
many would prefer not to hear. They emphatically declared that some
individuals were dissatisfied with the political community, with its traditions, with its closure to potential participants and their interests. They
tried to remind us that the common good is not static, that the dialogue
should never end, and that the community should never close. In short,
263.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418-19. The majority self-consciously echoed Justice
Holmes by denigrating the speaker. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
264.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
265.
Eichman, 110 S.Ct. at 2410. Also, Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Johnson, referred to flag burning as an "inarticulate grunt," Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432,
and Laurence Tribe testified before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights that the flag burner sends a "pathetic message." Statutory and Constitutional
Responses, supra note 233, at 104 (statement of Laurence Tribe).
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the flag burners were willing to risk themselves in the political conflict of
republican interpretivism.'
Thus, republican interpretivism suggests that the Supreme Court
correctly decided to protect flag desecration and that Congress correctly
decided not to amend the Constitution, but the public condemnation of the
flag burners was misplaced. The meaning of the common good, as it
emerges through the free speech clause, encourages us to protect the most
controversial means of participating in the communal dialogue. Because
of their controversial nature, these means of expression-whether they be
flag burning, draft card burning,' or anything else-are especially
likely to generate the kind of dialogue that challenges us to question our
traditions, to open our community, to include participants and interests in
an ever-continuing political dialogue over the common good. And
through this constant political dialogue, we reconstitute our traditions, our
community, and ourselves.
CONCLUSION

The republican revival and the interpretive turn are two of the
leading movements in 'constitutional jurisprudence. Civic republicanism
emphasizes that citizens belong to and participate in a political community. Within that community, the dominant activity is political dialogue that
ideally ends in the pursuit of the common good. Interpretivism,
meanwhile, holds that all of our practices, including constitutional
adjudication, are interpretive: we are always situated within interpretive
communities and traditions that simultaneously constrain and enable our
understanding of texts and text-analogues.
Republicanism and interpretivism, however, both face 'serious
challenges.
Critics of the republican revival charge that it invites
oppression and the silencing of divergent voices because it emphasizes the
community and the common good. Opponents of the interpretive turn
charge that it lacks the critical bite that we need to evaluate judicial
decisions. Republicanism and interpretivism, though, can be synthesized

266.

Cf. SHIFFRIN, supra note 134 (dissent is key element of American tradition).

See generally KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF

DEFIANCE 10-13 (1966) (the deviant actor helps a community to define and highlight its
shifting boundaries).
I do not mean to suggest that all controversial speech should be protected merely
because it is controversial. For example, whereas the speakers in the flag-burning cases
were challenging a dominant political group or outlook, the Nazis who wished to march
in Skokie, Illinois, sought to inflict emotional harm on an already oppressed religious
group. That is, the Nazis sought to close the community to a group that already was at
the margins. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g 477 F. Supp. 676
(N.D. 111. 1978).
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See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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into a single theory, republican interpretivism, that can withstand the
charges being leveled against each independent theory. As a theory of
American constitutional jurisprudence and political action, republican
interpretivism has critical bite because it focuses on the common good:
a constitutional decision as well as any other political action should be
evaluated by asking whether it promotes the common good. But the
common good is not an objective foundation for constitutional adjudication or political action, rather it is an interpretive concept. As such, its
meaning, while determinate in concrete contexts, always remains opeai to
questioning and to dialogue.

